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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
June 23, 1983 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 82-1630
HUDSON (Prison Guard}

v.
PALMER (Prisoner}

Cert to CA4
(Winter, Phillips,
Murnaghan}
Fed/Civil .

Timely

No. 82-6695 (cross-petn}
PALMER

v•

..

'

.·
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1.

SUMMARY:

These curve-lined cases raise several

issues concerning prison searches and intentional destruction
of inmates' non-contraband property.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Petr Hudson conducted

an unannounced "shakedown" of resp Palmer's locker in the
prison where resp is incarcerated.

Resp contended that the

seach was illegal and that petr had destroyed some of his non-

'---------- ---

contraband personal property.

[Petr did not find contraband.]

Resp brought this §1983 action, claiming that the shakedown
was part of an attempt by petr to harass resp.
The DC granted summary judgment for petr, holding that
petr's destruction of resp's property is not a denial of due
process

un~ ~ tt

~~~
The DC

remedy.

v. Taylor because resp has an adequate

'

also held that the claim of harassment does

not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.
On appeal,
remanded.

the~

affirmed in

part, ~versed

in part, and

It held that the DC correctly held that Parratt

prevents a cause of action for destruction of property.

This

is so even though 4 justices stated that they would limit its
scope to negligent acts.

There is no satisfactory rationale

for such a limitation; neither JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE
MARSHALL, nor JUSTICE POWELL offered a satisfactory rationale.
"[O]nce it is assumed that a postdeprivation remedy can cure
an unintentional but negligent act causing injury, inflicted
by a state agent which is unamenable to prior review, then
that principle applies as well to random and unauthorized

(?
L

- 3 intentional acts."

TheCA also affirmed the DC on the 8th

Amend.
The CA also held, however, that summary judgment was
premature with respect to the search of the locker.

Resp

claims the search was conducted as a means of harassment.

~Petr claims it was a routine search.

Since there is a genuine

issue of fact, summary judgment is proper only if it can be
said that resp had no privacy interest in the locker.

Other

CAs have held that prisoners have a limited privacy interest.
Irregular, unannounced searches of prisoner property are
permissible to ensure that prisoners do not possess
contraband.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441

u.s.

520, 555-57 (1979).

But searches motivated by the guard's desire to harass or
humiliate are not legitimate; the 4th Amend exists to protect
individuals from such arbitrary and oppressive invasions of
personal security.

The proper balance is to require prison

authorities, if the validity of the search is questioned, to
prove that adequate grounds existed to justify the search.
This may be done by proving that the search was conducted
pursuant to an established program of random searches, or that
some reasonable basis existed for a belief that the prisoner
possessed contraband.

A DC should consider direct proof that

the search was impermissibly motivated.

Parratt does not

affect the remedy for an unreasonable search.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that prisoners do not

have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells.
relies on JUSTICE POWELL's concurrence in United States v.

He

·-

- 4 Robinson, 414

u.s.

218, 237 (1973).

Bell v. Wolfish indicates

that prison administrators must be given great latitude in
preserving order and security.

Petr contends the CAs are

hopelessly split on the riature of the 4th Amend rights
retained by prisoners.

Among others (cited at Pet. 6),

Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222 Va 754, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981)
directly conflicts with the decision below.

The VaSCt

explicitly rejected the standards established by the CA in
this case.

It held that a prisoner's locker affords him a

right of privacy in relation to other inmates, but not as to
prison security officers.
Petr also contends that, even if the 4th Amend applies
for exclusionary rule purposes, as some CAs have held, it does
not apply for purposes of damages under §1983.
Petr also contends that the 14th Amend does not provide
resp with an expectation of privacy in this case.
should not have distinguished Parratt.

The CA

The only right the CA

is protecting is the right to be free from harassment, which
is adequately handled by post-deprivation remedies in the
prison.
Resp contends that, although the analysis of what is
reasonable changes in the prison context, the 4th Amend
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies in
prison.

Although a prisoner's privacy interest must be

subordinated to the legitimate concerns of law enforcement, it
still exists.

Resp alleged that petr conducted destructive,

ransacking searches of his cell and destroyed his property for

- 5 -

no reason other than to harass him.

These searches were

nothing more than official abuses of power.

Resp does not

refer to the conflict.
Resp has filed a cross-petn in which he contends that
Parratt should not have been applied to this case at all.
Resp contends that intentional deprivations of property by an
official abuse of power consititutes a due process violation
notwithstanding the existence of state remedies, or at least
when state relief is uncertain.
opinions in Parratt.

Resp relies on the separate

In any event, Va does not provide an

adequate postdeprivation remedy.
Resp also contends that lower courts need guidance in
interpreting Parratt.

There are numerous conflicts.

Petr contends the CA correctly applied Parratt.

Va

provides a definite, effective post-deprivation remedy.
Code §8.01-195.1 et

~is

Va

a tort claims act similar to the

one at issue in Parratt, in which Va has clearly waived its
sovereign immunity.

Petr also contends the cases applying

Parratt are consistent.
4.

DISCUSSION:

There does appear to be a conflict on

the issue raised in the petn.

There is not a direct conflict

on the issue raised in the cross-petn.

These cases present a

broad range of questions about §1983 that may be worth
addressing.

If the cross-petn is granted, however, the grant

should be limited to the first question presented.

The CA

found that Va provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

- 6 -

The second question presented challenges this view of state
law, and does not merit review here.
If the Court believes it can reach some agreement to
bring some order to this area, this would be a good case to
grant, limited in the cross-petn to the first question
presented.
There are responses to the petn and the cross-petn, and
motions of resp to proceed ifp on the petn and the cross-petn.
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HUDSON GINA-POW
82-1630

Hudson(prison guard) v. Palmer and

82-6695

Palmer v. Hudson

Having read the briefs, this is a memo to refresh my
recollection on certain points.

This case is probably set

for December, and I will have to reread the briefs when a
bench memo is available.
Palmer

(plaintiff)

for various felonies,

was a prisoner in a state prison
including bank robbery.

He brought

this §1983 suit against Hudson (defendant) a prison guard.
The

suit

is

against

Hudson

only;

not

against

other

officials or the state.
His complaint consists of the standard form provided
for

prisoners

use.

Its

critical

averment

is

that

defendant "shook down my locker and destroyed a lot of my
property,
personal

i.e.

legal

property only

materials,

letters,

as

of

a

means

and

harrassment.

other
The

shake-down was no routine shake-down"
The case was tried on summary judgment motions.
The defendant filed an affidavit avering that he had
conducted only a routine shake-down,
harassment purposes,

.

~(

~·

that it was not for

and was merely a routine search for

contraband.

He

denied

that

any

of

the

prisoner's

possessions were destroyed.
The District Court (Judge Dalton) dismissed the case,
but CA4 reversed and remanded for

trial.

The opinion by

Chief Judge Winter considered two separate questions:
1.
the

It held that Parratt v. Taylor, 451

relevant

claim

that

authority
his

with

property

respect

was

to

u.s.

the

intentionally

527 was

plaintiff's
destroyed.

Parratt involved only a negligent deprivation of property,
but

CA4

held

that

its

principle

applied

also

to

an

intentional deprivation.
The plaintiff's cross-petition

in this case appeals

from this decision, and argues that Parratt cannot be so
extended.

The

availability

holding

of

an

in

Parratt

adequate

also depended

state

remedy.

on

the

Plaintiff

argues here that there may not be an adequate state remedy
because of sovereign immunity.

The flaw in this argument

is that the suit was brought only against the individual
guard, not against the state or any official of it.
Given my view that the Constitution is trivialized by
finding

Constitutional

property
concluding

tort
that

is

rights

committed,
the

whenever
I

have

cross-petition

no
is

a

personal

or

difficulty

in

frivolous.

In

Parratt

did

I

make

a

distinction

between

negligent

and

intentional conduct, but given decision in Parratt I agree
with CA4 on this issue.
2.

The more important question is whether a prison

inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in prison,
and

therefore

is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection

against unreasonable searches.
-------------------~

CA4

concluded

that

there

is

a

limited

privacy

interest that is protected by the Fourth amendment.

The

Fourth Circuit drew a distinction between regular searches
and "individual shake-downs searches, such as that alleged
here".

Appendix 16.

The Fourth Circuit then concluded:

"Pris<;>ners will be accorded ~ol!le _grotes.tion
from abusive searches 6y requ!!Ing gr1s~ner
aut or I ies, /f I
t e val
ia I ty of" t:lie search is
,,
question~,
to prove that adequate ~rQYnds
existed to ·ustffy the search. When the-search
is a
ake-down o
a
particular prioner's
property, this may be done in one of two ways:
Either by proving that the search was done
pursuant to an established program of conducting
random searches of single cells or groups of
cells reasonably designed to deter or discover
the possession of contraband; or, by proving
that some reasonable basis existed for the
belief that the prisoner possessed contraband".
Appendix 16.
I

The

Fourth

had

Circuit

previously

held

that

"prisoners have a limited privacy interest and should be
free

from

unreasonable

confiscations",
appeals.

citing

searches

decisions

and

from

unjustifiable

seven

courts

of

I hope that my clerk will take a look at these

decisions.

I

would be surprised

if

the law is as well-

settled as CA4 indicates.
This is not a good case to address the Constitutional
question because it is here on summary judgment, and CA4
remanded

for

trial

on

the

facts.

But

CA4

placed

the

burden of proof on the ~~
s~~~ to show that the search was
reasonable.
c..c_ _ __

This is a rather extraordinary holding

understand

it

correctly).

placed on the plaintiff.

The

burden

Moreover,

(if I

customarily

is

if CA4's decision in

its present form becomes a law, the flood of §1983 prison
suits

that

impetus.

At

has

increased

least,

each

CA4 erred

year
in

its

will

given

a

new

allocation of

the

burden of proof.
Perhaps the fundamental question is whether there is
an expectation of privacy that is reasonable.
Harlen's

In Justice

concurring in Katz, he observed that "there is a

twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual

(subjective)

expectation of

privacy

and,

second,

that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable".

u.s.

389

at 361.

It is far from clear that a convicted felon even has
any

subjective

this,

of

But

privacy.

apart

from

I am not yet persuaded that if such an expectation

existed,
the

expectation

it would be viewed as

compelling

prisons,

to

state

limit

"reasonable"

interest

the

drug

to

in light of

perserve

traffic

generally to assure prison security.

in

order

in

prisons,

and

The task of penal

institutions is difficult enough without inviting the kind
of litigation that CA4's

opinion is likely to encourage.

See my opinion in Rhoads.

***
Having indicated my initial reactions,
have

not

familar

read
with

recognized

the
our

that

authorities
Bell

and

prisoners

relied

Wolff

d..o

on

I add that I

by CA4.

decisions

retain

some

I

am

in which

we

Constitutional

rights that are not inimical to prison administration or
security.
ad~sed

Neither of
the

Fourth

these cases,
Amendment

In Lanza v. New York, 370
a

plurality

of

the

u.s.

Court

however,

question

presented

138, 142-143,
held

that

specifically

(J.

there

here.

Stewart),
was

expectation of privacy on the part of prison inmates.

no
CA4

seems

to

think

that

the

rationale

of

Lanza

was

not

accepted in Wolff and Bell.
L.F.P.

'

'.

...

jen 12/05/83
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MEMORANDUM

~71.

Nos. 82-1630 & 82-6695
Hudson v. Palmer
Palmer v. Hudson

Joseph Neuhaus

December 5, 1983

Questions Presented
1.

Does the rule of Parratt v. Taylor, 451

u.s.

527 (1981),

that state tort remedies satisfy due process for negligent deprivations of property, extend to intentional deprivations?
2.
a

Does the destruction and confiscation of property during

prison

cell

search

conducted

prisoner violate either

(a)

with

the

aim of

harassing

substantive due process, or

Fourth Amendment?

l

;

{

,I

(b)

the
the

-

I.

Summary of Facts & Decisions Below

Prisoner Palmer brought this §1983 action alleging that prison guard Hudson violated his constitutional rights in conducting
a search of Palmer's prison locker solely for
harassment, and destroying Palmer's property.

the purposes of

The District Court

(Dalton, J.) held that, under Parratt v. Taylor, supra, the tort
remedies available to Palmer in the Virginia courts constituted
all the process that was due for the deprivation of property.

It

also held that the harassment allegation did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.

The DC appears not to have

considered the possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation (Palmer at that point was proceeding pro se) •
CA4

-r

(Winter, Phillips, Murnaghan)

the DC's analysis of Parratt.
shakedown search was
said that prisoners

It agreed with

It also found, however, that the

a violation of
retained

affirmed.

the Fourth Amendment.

It ~

limited privacy rights in prison,

and that those rights could be infringed only where necessary so
as not to impair prison administration or security.

Because of

the danger of harassment from shakedown searches, the court requi red that they be conducted either under a prison policy of
random searches, or on the basis of some reasonable basis to believe the search will uncover contraband.

The prison would be

'
required I to
prove" \ one of these bases if the prisoner alleged a

wrongful search •

.
,

-Lit:!

II.
1.

Summary.

Discussion

Palmer advances three ways in which the search

and destruction of property here might be unconstitutional:

(1)

as a deprivation of property without due process of law; (2) as a
violation of a substantive due process right to be protected from
abuse of official power; and

(3)

as a violation of the Fourth

Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
I

conclude that your concurrence in Parratt v. Taylor, supra,

as well as the logic of the majority opinion, suggest that the
Parratt rule that postdeprivation state law remedies provide due
process for deprivations of property should extend to this intentional

but

unauthorized

deprivation.

hearings
----..
will be ineffective in preventing this random, unauthorized act.
I

Predeprivation

also conclude that Virginia tort law remedies are adequate.
I

recommend against creating a substantive due process right

to be protected against abuse of power in a case involving an
attack on property rather than the person.

also think that it

I

does not "shock [] the conscience," the apparent standard for the tnl.
creation of

such

rights,

to

leave

prisoners abused by prison
-

~

h~

guards to state law remedies.
The Fourth Amendment question is more difficult.

Since ~

sonable expectations of privacy" in prison are governed solely by
prison regulations and customs,

rather than by shared societal

values, standard Fourth Amendment analysis would constitutionalize every claim that a search was conducted in violation of prison policy.

1-o

Therefore, I begin with the proposition that prisons

require a departure from prior doctrine.

c:___

Your partial dissent in

,J

{'

u.s.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441

520, 563

(1979), as well as dicta in

the majority opinion, suggests that there is some continued role
for the Fourth Amendment, at least when official and authorized
intrusions on the person rather than property are involved.

I do

not think the fact that the search here was unauthorized should
make a difference because whether state law would protect the
state actor or not has never made a difference in Fourth Amendrnent analysis.

I have much greater difficulty with whether the
lll

-tL

Fourth Amendment should protect inmate interests in property, as

------------------

--~

opposed to persons.

~

)

On the one hand, prisons must have virtually

plenary control over

inmate property,

and

recognizing

a

right

here would tend to expand the §1983 docket of the federal courts.
On the other hand,

it is difficult to call any search that is

based solely on harassment a "reasonable" search.
is

that

there

My bottom line

is some residual Fourth Amendment protection in

~$

/J7...L..d

prisons, even for property, but that CA4 erred in allocating to
the prison the burden of proving that a search was not abusive.
2.

Procedural due process.

In Parratt v. Taylor, supra, the

Court considered the procedural protections required to satisfy
due process when a negligent taking of property is alleged.
majority

held

that

such

takings

constituted

"deprivation"

The
of

property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, but that
state tort remedies provided the necessary process.
latter

holding on

It based the

the view that predepr ivation process is not

required when quick action by the State was necessary or when
providing such process was impracticable.
I

'

In Parra t t,

See 451

u.s.,

at 539.

involving the negligent loss of a rna i 1-order hobby

..

kit, the Court found that the deprivation occurred as a result of
"a random and unauthorized act by a state employee" so that providing predeprivation property would be impossible.
You concurred only in the result.

Id., at 541.

You found no "deprivation"

of property where the state actor was alleged to have acted only
negligently,

rather

than

intentionally.

In a

footnote

that

is

important here, however, you noted that
[a]ssuming that there was a "deprivation" of the hobby
kit under color of state law in this case, I would
agree with the Court's conclusion that state tort remedies
provide
adequate procedural protection.
Cf.
Ingraham v. Wright,
430 u.s.
651,
674-682
(1977)
(common-law remedies are adequate to afford procedural
due process in cases of corporal punishment of students).
451
to

u.s.,

at 547, n.l.

address

question,

any

(You also said that the Court had failed

substantive

due

process

right;

addressing

that

you found no such right to be free from negligent de-

privations of property.

This part of your concurrence is consid-

ered infra.)
The footnote in your concurrence in Parratt strongly suggests
that you would view the state law remedies discussed by the rnajority in Parratt as providing the process needed for intentional, and not just negligent, deprivations of property.
-though
Ingraham,

only

with

which

a

"cf."--your

involved

an

opinion

intentional

for

the

deprivation

You citedCourt
(in

in
that

case, of liberty).
In any case,

the majority's analysis in Par rat t--wh ich your )

footnote clearly appears to have endorsed--probably should not be \
limited to negligent deprivations.

The majority emphasized that

J

not part of an authorized policy.

It was a "random" act the oc-

cur renee of which could not be predicted.

Therefore elaborate

predeprivation procedures would be of no avail.

In this case,

where an officer is alleged to have acted intentionally, it is
less true that predeprivation procedures would have no effect.
Since the officer allegedly intended to act, a requirement of a
hearing before he did so would prevent him from acting wrongfully.

The crucial fact in Parratt, however, was that the act was

unauthorized.
I

'---"--believe

-

-

Here, the act also is alleged to be unauthorized.
~
that

fact,

if

true,

--

makes

'-

unlikely

it

~k
predeprivation procedures are
11 ely to have any effect.

that
If the

guard is not prevented from acting wrongfully by the available
postdeprivation

remedies,

there

is

nothing

to

suggest

that

I conclude,

predeprivation remedies would make any difference.

therefore, that Parratt should extend to intentional but unautho-

-----

rized deprivations of property.

-

The only time a predeprivation
,_.-

-

hearing can be effective is when the deprivation is pursuant to
rocedure.

some official
The

same

result

obtains

if

the

problem

is analyzed

under

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as Palmer urges.

That

case requires consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected ••• ~
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest ••. and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards~ and finally, the [state] interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.

'.

Id. ,

at

3 35.

Si nee

the

officer's

search

is unauthorized,

it

seems that the probable value of additional procedures is virtually nil.

Even if a prior hearing were required before every

search, or every confiscation of property, I suspect the costs in
terms of security would be too great to justify the deterrent
effect on guards bent on harassment. 1
The procedural due process question thus turns on whether the
state procedures provided by tort remedies and the prison grievance mechanism are adequate.

I do not believe Palmer succeeds in

proving that sovereign immunity might bar a suit against Hudson
in

state

court

for

intentional wrongs.

The Virginia

federal

courts that have examined the law have concluded that sovereign
immunity would offer

no protection

Petr. Reply Br. at 12-13.

in a case like this.

See

On the other hand, I would be reluc-

tant to rely on the inmate grievance procedure, even if it provides for compensation, since I suspect there is cause to wonder
how fair those tribunals were at the time Palmer brought his action.

See Addendum at 15-16

(warden or his designate initially

decides grievances).
2.

Substantive due process.

Prisoner Palmer suggests that

1 It is true, as Palmer points out, see Resp. Br. at 14,
n.l4, that Parratt's reliance on state procedures may mean that
negligent action by state officials, which is often immune from
suit in state court, will be actionable in the federal courts,
while intentional wrongs, which are often not immune, will not
be. This is a consequence of the Court's holding in Parratt and
not of this case. In any case, it is possible that the good
faith immunity available in §1983 actions, see Butz v. Economou,
438 u.s. 478 (1978), would prevent many if not most actions
founded on negligence.

there is a substantive due process right to be free of intentional abuses of state power.

If so, a §1983 action should be avail-

able to remedy the denial of that right.

This view finds some

support

You

in

your

Process Clause
and

under

concurrence

in

Parratt.

wrote,

"The Due

imposes substantive limitations on state action,

proper

circumstances

these

limitations may extend

to

intentional and malicious deprivations of liberty and property,
even where compensation is available under state law."
at 552-553

(footnotes omitted).

451 U.S.,

In support of the limitation on

intentional deprivations of property, you cited two lower court
cases that allowed actions against prison officials alleging an
intentional taking of property stored with the officials.
at 553,

n.l2

(CA7 1976)
1975)

(citing Kimbrough

v.

O'Neil,

Id.,

545 F.2d 1059, 1061

(en bane), and Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136

(CAS

(per curiam)).

The creation of any substantive due process right is essentially a matter of policy.
broad

right

Palmer

This case is not an exceptj.on.

to

be

free

from

intentional

abuses

advances

is

not dictated by any of

of

power

The
that

this Court's cases.

The language Palmer relies on, see Resp. Br. at 14-21, is generally dicta
167

(1961),

guarantee,

in distinguishable cases.
involved

a

Monroe v.

Pape,

365 U.S.

violation of an explicit constitutional

the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures.

(Monroe dealt with a warrantless night-

time search of a home by 13 police officers.)
Screws v. United States, 325

u.s.

The language in

91 (1945), is dictum in a case

having to do with abuses of power against the person, rather than

property.

(Screws involved the murder of a prisoner by police;

the question presented was whether

the criminal counterpart of

§1983 was unconstitutionally vague.)

Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los

Angeles,

227

u.s.

278

(1913),

is

a Lochner-era case

involving

allegedly confiscatory utility rates.
When

it is appropriate to create a

right is not entirely clear.
165

(1952)

(police

had

swallowed),

forced

the

of

In Rochin v. California, 342

u.s.

vomiting to discover drugs defendant

standard appears

pol ice conduct "shock red]

substantive due process

to have

the conscience.

the essential guidelessness of

been whether

Id. ' at 172.

II

the

Because

substantive due process,

and

the dangers of encouraging courts to create such rights, I would
think the standard must be at least that high.
In my view, it would be inappropriate to create such a ri9ht

' .......____

~

9~

f:

/1

n this case.

ri~here

Two considerations are paramount.

First, the de-

was of property, not of liberty or life.

A random

beating by a prison guard, and abuses directed at the person generally, would

whether

raise a far

conduct

appropriate.

"shocks

Second,

closer question.

the conscience,"

since

Parratt

v.

If the standard is

such a distinction
Taylor,

that deprivations like that which occurred

supra,

is

ensures

in this case are at

least partially remediable by state procedures, the real question
is whether it shocks the conscience to require the outrages here
to be submitted to a state forum.
forum and of litigating under

The advantages of a federal

§1983--~,

attorney's fees under

§1988--are not insubstantial, but they certainly are not fundamental in the way that the right to an abortion is.

(It may be

that

in Screws, which can be read to assume a substantive due

process right not to be murdered in state custody, the Court felt
that leaving abused black prisoners to the remedies provided by
Georgia's 1945 criminal process would shock the conscience.)
Thus, I would not recommend recognizing a due process right
to be free of abuse of authority.
without federal protection.

This does not leave prisoners

It simply means that they are left

with only the protections textually provided--the guarantees of
due process and equal protection, the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment, and, perhaps, the bar on unreasonable searches and seizures.
4.

Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment question in this

case pushes prior doctrine beyond its 1 imi ts.

Standard Fourth

Amendment analysis would have the Court look for

reasonable or

legitimate expectations of privacy in Palmer's prison locker and
possessions.

See vt:atz

v.

United States,

389 U.S.

347

(1968).

Outside of prisons and like institutions, the concept of legitimate

expectations

of

court pronouncements,

privacy

has

some content

independent of

because of the shared views of how much

society and government can intrude on the individual.

In prison,

a given prisoner's expectations of privacy are determined almost
entirely by the rules and customs of the prison.
on

policy

searches,

to

subject

all

prisoners

to

abusive

If it was prisand

harassing

traditional Fourth Amendment analysis would of fer

no

protection to prisoners, since they would have no reasonable expectation of privacy.

(The Eighth Amendment might place limits

on such conduct, however.)

On the other hand, any search more

intrusive

than

infringe on

permitted

a

by prison

administrative

legitimate expectation of

privacy.

rules would
Traditional

Fourth Amendment analysis would then ask whether there was a justification

for

the

intrusion.

If not,

a constitutional claim

would be made out.
The

trouble

is

that

this

approach

would J6onsti tutionalize

every violation of prison search guidelines : ' Given proper proce-

~---------------------------------

'-

dures and proper allocation of burdens of proof, this would not
necessarily be disastrous for the dockets of the federal courts.
But it would mean that the content of the Fourth Amendment,

which ~~

-z:_.-

has heretofore been thought to be uniform throughout the country,
would vary from institution to institution.
~

It would also create

~------------

an incentive for institutions to create absolutely minimal guidelines and limitations on searches in order to avoid federal court
intrusion.

That the federal courts and this Court would have a

role in enforcing prison administrative regulations seems to me a

_

distinctly odd result.
I conclude that prisons require some de'-----...
from ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis.

---------~--------------~--------------One possible role for the Fourth Amendment is that it would
protect privacy interests that are so fundamental that they are
retained

from

the outside when

Smith v. Maryland,
gesting that

w~en

442

u.s.

735,

an

inmate enters prison.

740 n.S

(1979)

(dictum)

See
(sug-

subjective expectations of privacy are condi-

tioned by influences "alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms,"

a

"normative

United States, 389

u.s.

inquiry"
347, 361

is proper);
(1968)

see also Katz v.

(Harlan, J., concurring)

(expectation of privacy must "be one that society is prepared to

......

4

recognize as 'reasonable'").

u.s.

441

/

In your dissent in Bell v. Wolfish,

520, 563 (1979), you appeared to suggest some such inde-

pendent role for the Fourth Amendment.

There, pretrial detainees

challenged prison policies of searching cells without prisoners
present

and

visits.

visually

inspecting body cavities after contact

The Court assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied in

prison,
with

of

and upheld both practices as reasonable.

respect

to body-cavity searches,

and

9

You dissented

in doing

so you ap-

----------------------------------------

peared to acknowledge that privacy interests continued in prison.
You wrote:
In view of the serious intrusion on one's privacy occasioned by such a search, I think at least some level of
cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal and genital searches described in this case.
I therefore dissent on this
issue.
Ibid.

This

suggests

that you

saw some

prison, independent of prison rules.

residuum of pr ivaqy_ in

Moreover, there is language

in the Court's opinion that suggests that it, too, thought that
there was some rock-bottom role for the Fourth Amendment in prison.

While

the

merely assumed
discussed

opinion,
that

whether

per JUSTICE

REHNOUIST,

the Fourth Amendment applied

that

Amendment

might

address

stated

that

it

in prison,

it

the

problem of

body-cavity searches conducted in an abusive manner.

The Court

suggested that it would, noting, "Such abuse cannot be condoned.
The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner,"

id., at

560, and cited a Fourth Amendment case, Schmerber v. California,
384

u.s.

757, 771-772 (1966).

If

the

Fourth

Amendment

continues

to

protect

prisoners

against certain kinds of very intrusive searches, the question is
whether the search here implicates the kind of fundamental values
that are protected.

It might be tempting to answer this question

the way the substantive due process inquiry was answered, supra.
That is, it might be concluded that only very intrusive searches
that are part of a prison policy or program, as in Bell, are subInstrus i ve searches that

ject to Fourth Amendment strictures.

are merely individual abuses of power would be subject only to a
state-law or statutory remedy.

Put another way, the only privacy

right subject to federal protection that would be said to be carr ied into prison with the inmate would be the right not to be
subjected to a system that routinely subjects him to harassing
and abusive procedures.
One problem here is that this would require distinguishing or
overruling Monroe v. Pape, supra.
a

nonpr ison context

provided

protection

that the fact
identical

to

There the Court ruled that in
that the state constitution
that

provided

by

the

Fourth

Amendment was no bar to asserting a §1983 claim for an unreasonable search.

See 365

u.s.,

at 183.
II

The rule appears to be that
~~

•

at least when a violation of a textual right is alleged, exhaustion of state remedies is not required.

Of course, prisons are

different, but I am not sure they are different in a way that is
relevant to this question.

The Court in Monroe based its view on

the legislative history of §1983, which it read to contain an
intent to ensure "a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise,

·,

/ '~~~
state laws might not be enforced."
risk exists in prison.

365

u.s.,

at 180.

The same

Another way to distinguish Monroe might

be that that case concerned the scope of the federal remedy under
§1983, and not of the canst i tut ional right.
the extent of the Fourth Amendment right.

The issue here is

To this the only an-

swer is that it seems to me that an unreasonably intrusive search
conducted without authorization is still unreasonable.

I con-

elude that, while it is possible to limit the Fourth Amendment to
barring intrusive searches carried out pursuant to policy, rather
than

those

would

that

introduce

analysis.

are the result of
an

entirely

new

individual harassment,

factor

into Fourth

this

Amendment

It has always been thought that the bar on unreason-

able searches by government depended to a greater extent on the
character of the intrusion than on the nature of the intruder.

I

do not think the prison context dictates such a change.
Another approach to the question of what fundamental rights
of privacy one carries

into prison is to examine the personal

interest abused rather than the nature of the abuse.

The primary

difference between the interest implicated by the discussions in
Bell and that here is that here the search is of property, not of
the person.

There is a commonsense difference between the degree

of intrusion that is reasonable in a search of a person and that
which is reasonable in a search of property.

This distinction is /

highlighted in prison, because of the important need to control
the possession of weapons and other contraband.

That need die-

tates that prison authorities have virtually plenary control over
the prisoners' right to have property.

'

.

They could no doubt re-

~

quire that all property be kept out in the open at all time, or
perhaps prohibit possessions entirely.

Therefore, it may be that

any search of a possession capable of secreting contraband is a
Although it is true that the body can also be

reasonable one.

used to secrete contraband,

in cases of searches of the person

the prisoner's more basic right to bodily integrity is implicated.
I frankly am uncertain at this point how I would rule on this

-

question.

leged

On the one hand, as Palmer points out, the search al-

here was plainly unreasonable because it was, as alleged,
On the other hand,

utterly unjustified.

it is not clear that

prisoners should have constitutionally recognized privacy rights
in property.

In particular, recognizing such rights would allow

the continued expansion of the federal §1983 docket, a problem
you have more than once warned against, see Parratt, supra, at
554 n.l3

u.s.c.

(Powell,

J.,

concurring

in

the

result).

But see 42

§1997e, discussed in Cross-Petr. Reply at 11-14 (Congress

now allows courts to require that prisoners exhaust prison grievance mechanisms in certain circumstances) .

It may be that a pro-

phylactic rule is necessary to allow prison authorities sufficient freedom to do their job.

,,

My very tentative view is that the sheer unreasonableness of
' - - - - - - - - - - - r - _.....,,

the search ~~leged here is the paramount consideration.

The lan-

guage of the Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people
to

be

secure

in

their

persons,

houses,

papers,

against unreasonable searches and seizures."

and

effects,

I have difficulty

finding in this language any way to exempt from protection plain-

11 ••

ly unreasonable searches of "papers and effects," simply because
they occur in prison.

The judicial gloss limiting protection to

legitimate expectations of privacy is simply not appropriate to
the

prison

The

context.

prison's

plenary control

over

inmate

property may justify far more restrictive actions than this, but
it cannot justify pure harassment.
This

does

not

mean CA4

should

be

affirmed,

court required prison officials "to prove adequat

however.

That

grounds exist-

ed to justify the search" solely on allegation that it was abusive.

J.A.

at 43.

This is far

too low a standard.

As Hudson

points out, Petr. Br. at 21-22, the burden should be on the pris- ~
oner to make out a prima facie case.
should be

required

At the least, the prisoner ~~~

to make specific allegations of

ways in which the search was far

the precise

in excess of what was reason-

able, and of why he thinks the search was intended solely to harass.

Objective facts would have to be alleged, rather than con-

elusions.

In the absence of a plain admission of harassment, a

pattern or practice would probably be necessary to prove intent.
Measured under these standards, the complaint and affidavits
here fell far short.

The affidavits and complaints do not state

how the search exceeded the customary or authorized search, nor
any basis other

than a passing

remark for

the search was motivated by harassment.

their suspicion that

In addition, they fail

to mention that the search was carried out by two officers, not
just one,

and

show no basis whatsoever

second officer had a harassing pur
III.

RECOMMENDATION:

for

se.

Reverse & remand.
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that the
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 82-1630 AND 82-6695

TED S. HUDSON, PETITIONER
82-1630

v.
RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR.

RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR., PETITIONER
82-6695
v.
TED S. HUDSON
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~ . ~
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
c:::;~ ~
[June-, 1984]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari in No. 82-1630 to decide whether a
prison inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
prison cell entitling 1i1m to --ui'eprotection of Uie Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.
We also granted certiorari in No. ~2-66911 the cross-petition,
to determine whether our decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U. S. 527 (1981), which held that a negligent deprivation of
prope~ by state offi:cials does not violate the Fourteenth
Arileiiament if an adequate postdei:>rivation state remeay exisfs,s houla extend to intentional deprivations of property.
I

The facts underlying this dispute are relatively simple.
Respondent Palmer is an inmate at the Bland Correctional
Center in Bland, Va., serving sentences for forg~r
i~, and bank robbery convictions. On September 16, 1981, petitioner Hudson, an officer at the Correc-

U

.
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tional Center, with a fellow officer, conducted a "shakedown"
search of res ondent's prison locker and cell forCOntra and.
Durmg t e "shakedown, ' t e o cers discovered a ripped pill wcase in a trashcan near respondent's cell bunk. Charges
against Palmer were instituted under the prison disciplinary
procedures for destroying State property. After a hearing,
Palmer was found guilty on the charge and was ordered to
reimburse the State for the cost of the material destroyed; in
addition, a reprimand was entered on his prison record.
Palmer subsequently brought this pro se action in United
States District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Respondent
claimed that Hudson had conducted the shakedown search of
his cell and had brought a false charge against him solely to
harass him, and that, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment ri ht not tol)e de nved of ro erty without due process of law, Hudson had intentiona_!!l destroyed certain of his
noncontraband personal property durmg the September 16
search. Hudson a 'ed each allegation; he moved for and
was granted summary jud ent The District Court accepte responden s a egations as true but held nonetheless,
relying on Parratt v. Taylor, supra, that the alleged destruction of respondent's property, even if intentional, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because there were state
tort remedies available to redress the deprivation, J. A. 31 1
and that the alleged harassment did not "rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation," id., at 32.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed i!l_])art,
and remanded fo/ further proceedings. 697 F. 2d 1220 (CA4
1983):-The court affirmed the District Court's holding that
respondent was not deprived of his property without due
process. The court acknowledged that we considered only a

(

1
The District Court determined that Palmer could pro~ed against Hudson.._in state ~urt either for co~ue, and that under applicable Vir~law, see Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S. E. 2d 369
(1967), Hudson would not be entitled to immunity for the alleged intentional tort.

l}~
~;'K_I

jJ~v

-

T~

::!!~
Y/ JJjP·
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claim of negligent property deprivation in Parratt v. Taylor,
supra. It agreed with the District Court, however, that the
logic of Parratt applies equally to unauthorized intentional
deprivations of property by state officials: "[O]nce it is assumed that a postdeprivation remedy can cure an unintentional but negligent act causing injury, inflicted by a state
agent which is unamenable to prior review, then that principle applies as well to random and unauthorized intentional
acts." I d., at 1223. 2 The Court of Appeals did not discuss
the availability and adequacy of existing state law remedies;
it presumably accepted as correct the District Court's statement of the remedies available under Virginia law. 3
The Court of Appeals reversed the summa judgment on
resp_om~nt's c a1m
at e sha e
c was unreasonable.
e coUrt recogruzed that Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.
520~555-557 (1979) authorized in·egular unannounced shakedown searches of prison cells. But the court held that an individual prisoner has a "limited prixacy right" in his cell entitling him to protection against searches conducted solely to
harass or to humiliate. 697 F. 2d, at 1225. 4 The shakedown
The Court of Appeals observed that "there is no practical mechanism
by which Virginia could prevent its guards from conducting personal vendettas against prisoners other thap by punishing them after the fact ... ."
697 F. 2d, at 1223.
·
3
See n. 1, supra.
• Petitioner maintai11s that the Court of Appeals' decision rests at least
in part upon a finding of an independent right of privacy for prisoners
under the Fourteenth Amendment alone. While, arguably, it is not entirely clear whether the Court of Appeals believed that the limited privacy
right it recognized was guaranteed solely by the Fourth Amendment, and
applicable to the States only through the rFourteenth Amendment, or
whether the right erfianated from the Fourteenth Amendment alone, or
both. Its opinion, however, explicitly speaks to the "primary purpose of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," id., at 1224, and nowhere does
it suggest an intention to draw a distinction between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments right of privacy in prison cells. Under the circumstances, we assume, since there is no suggestion to the contrary, that the
court did not mean to imply in this context that any right of privacy that
2

I

82-1630 &
4
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of a single prisoner's property, said the court, is permissible
only if "done pursuant to an established program of conducting random searches of single cells or groups of cells reasonably designed to deter or discover the possession of contraband" or upon reasonable belief that the particular prisoner
possessed contraband. I d., at 1224. Because the Court of
Appeals concluded that the record reflected a factual dispute
over whether the search of respondent's cell was routine or
conducted to harass respondent, it held that summary judgment was inappropriate, and that a remand was necessary to
determine the purpose of the cell search.
We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
II
A

The fir~tion we address is whether respondent has a
right of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5 As we have noted, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court's summary judgment in petitioner's favor was premature because respondent had a
"limited privacy right" in his· cell that might have been
breached. The court concluded that, to protect this privacy
might exist under the Fourteenth Amendment alone exceeds that that exists under the Fourth Amendment.
•The majority of Courts of Appeals have held that a risoner retains at
least a minima e ee of Fourth men ment rotection in his cell. See
nited States v. Chamorro, 687 F. 2d 1 (CAl 1982); United States v.
Hinckley, 672 F. 2d 115 (CADC 1982); United States v. Lilly, 576 F. 2d
1240 (CA5 1978); United States v. Stumes, 549 F. 2d 831 (CA8 1977); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F . 2d 1311 (CA7 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 545 F. 2d
565 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978). The Second and
Ninth Circuits, however, have held that the Fourth AmendmentdOeS not
app1Y1ilai)rison cell. See Umted States v. "Httchcock, 467 F. 2d 1107
(C~nied, 410 U. S. 916 (1973); Christman v. Skinner, 468
F. 2d 723 (CA2 1972).
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right, shakedown searches of an individual's cell should be
perfonned only "pursuant to an established program of conducting random searches ... reasonably designed to deter or
discover the possession of contraband" or upon reasonable
belief that the prisoner possesses contraband. Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent had even a limited privacy right in his cell, and
urges that we adopt the "bright line" rule that prisoners have
no legitimate expectation of privacy in their individual cells
that would entitle them to Fourth Amendment protection.
We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the
reach of the Constitution. . No "iron curtain" separates one
from the other. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 555. Indeed, we have insisted that prisoners be accorded those
rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.
For example, we have held that invidious racial discrimination is as intolerable within a prison as outside, except as may
be essential to "prison security and discipline." Lee v.
Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) (per curiam). Like others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the
Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a
reasonable right of access to the courts. Johnson v. Avery,
393 u. s. 483 (1969).
They must be provided "reasonable opportunities" to exercise their religious freedom guaranteed under the First
Amendment. Cru:z v. Beto·, 405 U. S. 319 (1972) (per
curiam). Similarly, prisoners retain those First Amendment rights of speech "not inconsistent with [their] status as
... prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S.
817, 822 (1974). They enjoy the protection of due process.
Wolffv. McDonnell, supra; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519
(1972). And the Eighth Amendment ensures that they will
not be subject to "cruel and unusual punishments." Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). The continuing guarantee of
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these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a
belief that the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence of the essential character of
that society.
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many
protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscri tion o oss of
sigee Bell v. Wolfish, 441 . S. 520, 545
nificant r1g s.
(1979). 'l'fiese constraints on inmates, and in some cases the
complete withdrawal of certain of their rights, are "justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price
v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 545-546 (1979), and cases cited; Wolff v.
McDonnell, supra, at 555. The curtailment of certain rights
is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad
of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities,
Wolffv. McDonnell, supra, at 555, chief among which is internal security, see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 823
(1974). Of course, these restrictions or retractions also
serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of
justice, deterrence, and retribution are factors in addition to
correction.
We have not before been called upon to decide the specific
question whether the Fourth Amendment applies within a
prison cell, 6 but the nature of our inquiry is well-defined.

man--

6

InLanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-144 (1962), a\{i)uralit] of the
Court termed as "at best a novel argument" the assertion that a prison "is a
place where [one] can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure
of his person, his papers, or his effects." This observation, however, was
plainly dictum. In fact, three Members of the Court specifically dissented
from what they characterized as the Court's "gratuitous exposition of several grave constitutional issues . . . . " !d., at 150 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting).
In upholding a room search rule against a Fourth Amendment challenge
by pretrial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish, supra, the Court acknowledged
the plausibility of an argument that "a person confined in a detention facility has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell

J
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We must determine here, as in other Fourth Amendment
contexts, if a "justifiable" expectation of privacy is at stake.
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). The applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether "the person
invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,'
or a 'legitimate expectation of. privacy' that has been invaded
by government action." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, .
740 (1979), and cases cited. We must decide, in Justice Harlan's words, whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy in
his prison cell is the kind of expectation that "society is 2rep ed to reco "ze as 'reasonable.'" Katz, supra, at 360, 361
(concurring opmwn .
and that, therefore, the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for
such a person." 449 U. S., at 556-557. However, as in Lanza, it was unnecessary to reach the issue of the Fourth Amendment's general applicability in a prison cell. We simply assumed arguendo that a pretrial detainee
retained at least a "diminished expectation of privacy." !d., at 557.
7
In Katz, Justice Harlan suggested that an expectation of privacy is
"justifiable" if the person concerned has "exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy" and the expectation ·is one that "society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable."' 389 U. S., at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court has always emphasized the second of these two requirements. As Justice White said, writing for the plurality in United States v.
White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971), "[o]ur problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular situations may be or the extent to which they may in fact have relied on the discretion of their companions.... Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is
what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable' .... " I d., at
751-752. In the same opinion, even Justice Harlan stressed the controlling importance of the second of these two requirements: "The analysis
must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations ....
[W]e should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society." United
States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 768, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court's refusal to adopt a test of "subjective expectation" is understandable; constitutional rights are generally not defined by the subjective
intent of those asserting the rights. The problems inherent in such a
standard are self-evident. See, e. g., Smith v. Maryland, supra, at
740-741, n. 5.
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Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we
hold that society is not re ared to recognize as legitimate
an s ~ective expectation of privacy t at a prisoner nug t
have m s pnson ce an t a accordingly, t e ou h
Amendment does not apply within the confines of the prison
cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their
individual cells simply cannot be rec.onciled with the concept
of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal
institutions.
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons wno have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have
necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform
their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the
normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a
respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others.
Even a partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our
Nation's prisons illustrates the magnitude of the problem.
During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120
prisoners murdered--by fellow inmates in State and Federal
prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by
prisoners during this period. Over twenty-nine riots or similar disturbances were reported in these facilities for the
same time frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these
institutions. See 8 Corrections Compendium, Prison Violence (1983).
Within this volatile "community," prison administrators
are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only
the pr1son staffs and administrative personnel, but visitors.
They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must
be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is
one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they

l
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must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons
into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots,
in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the
schemes materialize. In addition to these monumental
tasks, it is incumbent upon these officials at the same time to
maintain as sanitary an environment for the inmates as feasible, given the difficulties of the environment.
The adniinistration of a prison, we have said, is "at best an
extraordinarily difficult undertaking." Wolffv. McDonnell,
supra, at 566; Hewitt v. Helms,-- U.S.--,-- (1983).
But it would be literally impossible to accomplish the prison
objectives identified above if inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells. Virtually the only place inmates can conceal weapons, drugs and other contraband is in their cells.
Unfettered access to these cells by prison officials, thus, is
imperative if drugs and contraband are to be ferretted out
and sanitary surroundings are to be maintained.
Determining whether an expectation of privacy is "legitimate" or "reasonable" necessarily entails a_balancing of interests. The two interests here, of course, are the interest of
sOcie'ty in the security of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his cell, which is already
limited by the exigencies of the circumstances. We strike
the balance in favor of institutional security, which we have
noted is "central to all other corrections goals," Pell v.
Procunier, supra, at 823. A right of privacy in traditional
Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible
with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their
cells required to ensure institutional security and internal
order.
We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security; a
prison "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an
automobile, an office, or a hotel room." Lanza v. New York,
supra, at 143-144. We believe that it is accepted by our so-
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ciety that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement." Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at
537.

The Court of Appeals was troubled by the possibility of
searches conducted solely to harass inmates; it reasoned that
a requirement that searches be conducted only pursuant to
an established policy or upon reasonable suspicion would prevent such searches to the maximum extent possible. Of (
course, there is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and
of course, intentional harassment of even the most hardened
criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society. However, we disagree with the court's roposed solution. The
uncertainty at a en s random search.es of ce ls renders
these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the
prison administrator in the constant fight against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit drugs and other -contraband.
The Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged that "the device
[of random cell searches] is of ... obvious utility in achieving
the goal of prison security." 697 F. 2d, at 1224.
A requirement that even random searches be conducted
pursuant to an established plan would se~iously undermine
the effectiveness of this weapon. It is naive to believe that
prisoners would not eventually decipher any plan officials
might devise for "planned random searches," and thus be
able routinely to anticipate searches. The Supreme Court of
Virginia identified the shortcomings of an approach such as
that adopted by the Court of Appeals and the necessity of allowing prison administrators flexibility:
"For one to advocate that prison searches must be conducted only pursuant to an enunciated general policy or
when suspicion is directed at a particular inmate is to ignore the realities of prison operation. Random searches
of inmates, individually or collectively, and their cells
and lockers are valid and necessary ,to ensure the security of the institution and the safety of inmates and all
others within its boundaries. This type of search allows
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prison officers flexibility and prevents inmates from
anticipating, arid thereby thwarting, a search for contrao v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 754, 284
band."
S. E. 2d 809 (1981).
'-;:::;We share the concerns so well expressed by the Supreme
Court and its view that wholly random searches are an important part of the effective security of penal institutions.
We, therefore, cannot accept even the concededly limited
holding of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent acknowledges that routine shakedowns of
prison cells are essential to the effective administration of
prisons. Brief for Respondent 7, n. 5. He contends, however, that he is constitutionally entitled not to be subjected to
searches conducted only to harass. The crux of his claim is
that "because searches and seizures to harass are unreasonable, a prisoner has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to
have his cell, locker, personal effects, person invaded for
such a purpose." Brief for Respondent 24. This argument,
which assumes the answer to the predicate question whether
a prisoner has - a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
prison cell at ali, is merely a challenge to the reasonableness
of the particular search of respondent's cell. Because we
conclude that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the F,.ourth Amendment does not apply in
prison cells, we neEfd not reach this issue.
Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable J
expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections
~
of the Fourth Amendment does not mean that he is without a
remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. ~
No? does it mea n t1lat prison attendants can ride roughshod
over inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth
Amendment al~ays stands as a protection against "cruel and
unusual punishments." By the same token, there are adequ_a te state t prt and commQ!!J.aw la~dies available to_
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respondent to redress the alleged destruction of his personal
property. See discussion infra, at - - . 8
B

In his complaint in the District Court, in addition to his
claim that the shakedown search of his cell violated his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights, respondent alleged under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 that petitioner intentionally destroJ:ed certain of his personal property during the
search. This destruction, respondent contended, deprived
him of property without due process, in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District
Court dismissed this portion of respondent's complaint for
failure to state a claim. Reasoning under Parratt v. Taylor,
supra, it held that even an intentional destruction of property by a state employee does not violate due process if the
state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. The question presented for our
review in Palmer's cross-petition is whether our decision in
Parratt v. Taylor should extend, as the Court of Appeals
held, to intentional deprivations of property by state employees acting under color of state law. 9
In Parratt v. Taylor, a state prisoner sued prison officials
under 42 0. S. C. § I9B3, alleging that their negligent loss of
8
The Commonwealth has a new inmate grievance procedure that was
effective as of October, 12 1982, see note 14 infra. But it appears that at
the time of the alleged deprivation of respondent's property, a very similar
procedure was in effect that would also have afforded respondent relief for
any destruction of his property. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 14.
9
Four Circuits, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in this
case, have held that Parratt does extend to intentional deprivations of
property. See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquest, 699 F. 2d 864 (CA7 1983);
Engblom v. Carey, 677 F. 2d 957 (CA2 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Board
of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981), aff'd sub nom. Rutledge v. Kush,
U. S. (1983). Three Circuits have held that it does not.
Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F. 2d 387 (CA5 1982); Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.
2d 1320 (CA9 1982); Yusuf Asad Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F. 2d 868
(CA7 1981).
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a hobby kit he ordered from a mail-order catalogue deprived
him of property without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had affirmed the District Court's summary
judgment in the prisoner's favor. We reversed, holding that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
violated when a state employee negligently deprives an individual of property, provided that the State makes available a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy. 10
We viewed our decision in Parratt as consistent with prior
cases recognizinithat

-

~

"either the necessity of quick action by the state or the
impracticability
of providing
any
meaningful
predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the state's action at some time after the initial
taking ... satisf[ies] the requirements of procedural due
process." 451 U. S., at 527 (footnote omitted).

We reasoned that where a loss of property is occasioned by a
random, unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than
by an established state procedure, the state cannot predict
when the loss will occur. Id., at 541. Urider these circumstances, we observed,
"[i]t is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide
a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place.
The loss of property, although attributable to the state
as action under "color of law," is in almost all cases beyond the control of the State. Indeed, in most cases it is
10
Nebraska had provided respondent with a tort remedy for his alleged
property deprivation. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,209 et seq. (1976). We held
that this remedy was entirely adequate to satisfy due process, even
though we recognized that it might not provide respondent all the relief to
which he might have been entitled under§ 1983. 451 U. S., at 54~.

'
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not only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a
meaningful hearing before the deprivation." Ibid. 11
Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed our holding in Pa"rratt in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982), in the
course of holding that postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy
due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state procedure, rather than
random and unauthorized action. 12
While Parratt is necessarily limited by its facts to negligent deprivations Of property, it is evident, as the Court of
Appeals recognizea, that its reasoning applies as well to intentional deprivations of property. The underlying rationale
of Parratt is that when deprivations of property are effected
through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable"
since the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur. We can discern no logical distinction between negligent
and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the "practicability'' of affording predeprivation process is concerned.
The State can no more anticipate and control in advance the
random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct. Argu11
In reaching our conclusion in Parratt, we expressly relied on thenJudge Stevens' opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517
F. 2d 1311 (1975), modified en bane, 545 F. 2d 656 (1976), cert. denied, 435
U. S. 932 (1978), holding that, where an individual has been negligently deprived of property by a State employee, the State's action is not complete
unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss. 451 U. S., at 541-542.
12
In Logan, we examined a claim that the terms of an Illinois statute
deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to pursue his employment discrimination claim. We specifically distinguished the case from Parratt by
noting that "Parratt was dealing with a 'random and unauthorized act by a
state employee ... [and was] not a result of some established state procedure."' 455 U. S., at 435-436 (quoting Parratt, supra, at 541). Parratt,
we said, "was not designed to reach ... a situation" where the deprivation
is the result of an established state procedure. I d., at 436.

~
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ably, intentional acts are even more difficult to anticipate because one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his
property might well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling
his intent.
If negligent deprivations of property do not violate the Due
Process Clause because predeprivation process is impracticable, it follows that intentional deprivations do not violate
that Clause provided, of course, that adequate state
postdeprivation remedies are available. Accordingly, we
hold that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property
by-a-8tate employee does ot constitu a violation of the
Fou een
men men 1 a eanmgful post epriVation remedYfor the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent
deprivations of property by State employees, the State's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to
provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy. 13
Respondent presses two arguments that require at least
brief comment. First, he contends that, because an agent of
the state who intends to deprive a person of his property
"can provide predeprivation process, then as a matter of due
process he must do so." Brief for Respondent at 8 (emphasis
in original). · This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Parratt. There we held that postdeprivation
procedures satisfy due process because the State cannot possibly know in advance of a negligent deprivation of property.
Whether an individual employee himself is able to foresee a
deprivation is simply of no consequence. The controlling inquiry is whether the State is in a position to provide for
predeprivation process. The obligations of the Fourteenth
3
' Our holding that an intentional deprivation of property does not give
rise to a violation of the Due Process Clause if the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy was foreshadowed by our discussion of
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), in Parratt. We noted that our
analysis was "quite consistent" with that in Ingraham, a case that, we observed, involved intentional conduct on behalf of State officials. 451
U. S. , at 542.

/~

82-1630 & 82-6695--0PINION
16

HUDSON v. PALMER

Amendment rest not on the individual employee, but on the
State.
Respondent also contends, citing to Logan v. Zimmerman \
Brush Co., supra, that the deliberate destruction of his property by petitioner constituted a due process violation despite
the availability of postdeprivation remedies. Ibid. In Logan, we decided a question about which our decision in
Parratt left little doubt, that is, whether a postdeprivation
state remedy satisfies due process where the property deprivation is effected pursuant to an established state procedure.
We held that it does not. Logan plainly has no relevance
here. Respondent does not even allege that the asserted de- J
struction of his property occurred pursuant to a state
procedure.
·
Having determined that Parratt extends to intentional
deprivations of property, we need only decide whether the
Commonwealth of Virginia provides respondent an adequate
postdeprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of his
property. Both the District Court and, at least implicitly,
the Court of Appeals held that several common law remedies
available to respondent would provide adequate compensation for his property loss. We have no reason to question
that determination, particularly given the speculative nature
of respondent's arguments.
Palmer does not seriously dispute the adequacy of the existing state law remedies themselves. He asserts in this respect only that, because certain of his legal papers allegedly
taken "may have contained things irreplacable [sic], and
incompensable" or "may also have involved sentimental items
which are of equally intangible value," Brief for Respondent
10-11, n. 10, a suit in tort, for example, would not "necessarily" compensate him fully. If the loss is "incompensable,"
this is as much so under§ 1983 as it would be under any other
remedy. In any event, that Palmer might not be able torecover under these remedies the full amount which he might
receive in a § 1983 action is not, as we have said, determi-
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native of the adequacy of the State remedies. See Parratt,
supra, at 544.
Palmer contends also that relief under applicable State law
"is far from certain and complete" because a state court
might hold that petitioner, as a State employee, is entitled to
sovereign immunity. Id., at 11. This suggestion is unconvincing. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held
that respondent's claim would not be barred by sovereign immunity. As the District Court noted, under Virginia law, "a
State employee may be held liable for his intentional torts,"
Elder v. Holland, 208, Va. 15, 19, 155 S. E. 2d 369, 372-373
(1967); see also Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53, 255 S. E. 2d 479
(1979). Indeed, respondent candidly acknowledges that it is
"probable that a Virginia trial court would rule that there
should be no immunity bar in the present case." ld., at 14.
Respondent attempts to cast doubt on the obvious breadth
of Elder through the naked assertion that "the phrase 'may
be held liable' could have meant ... only the possibility of
liability under certain circumstances rather than a blanket
rule .... " I d., at 13. We are equally unpersuaded by this
speculation. The language of Elder is unambiguous that employees of the Commonwealth do not enjoy sovereign immunity for their intentional torts, and Elder has been so read by
a number of federal courts, as respondent concedes, see Brief
for Respondent 13, n. 13. See, e. g., Holmes v. Wampler,
546 F. Supp. 500, 504 (ED Va. 1982); Irshad v. Spann, 543 F.
Supp. 922, 928 (ED Va. 1982); Frazier v. Collins, 544 F.
Supp. 109, 110 (ED Va. 1982); Whorley v. Karr, 534 F. Supp.
88, 89 (WD Va. 1981); Daughtry v. Arlington County, Va.,
490 F. Supp. 307 (D DC 1980). 14 In sum, it is evident here,
It is noteworthy that the Commonwealth has enacted the State Tort
Claims Act, Va. Code §§ 8.01-195.1 et seq. (Supp. 1983), which, in defined
circumstances, waives sovereign immunity. Additionally, as of October
12, 1982, the State has in place an inmate grievance procedure that received the certification of the Attorney General of the United States as in
compliance with the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
14
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as in Parratt, that the State has provided an adequate
postdeprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of
property.
III
We hold that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a prison cell and, therefore, that the Fourth
Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell. We hold
also that, even if petitioner intentionally destroyed respondent's personal property during the challenged shakedown
search, the destruction did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment since the Commonwealth of Virginia has provided respondent an adequate postdeprivation remedy.
Accordingly, the judgment .of the Court of Appeals reversing and remanding the District Court's judgment on respondent's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments claim is reversed.
The judgment affirming the District Court's decision that respondent has not been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed. Supp. IV). Although apparently neither of
these avenues was open to this respondent, both are potential sources of
relief for persons in respondent's position in the future.
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June 1, 1984

Re: 82-1630 & 6695-Hudson v. Palmer
Dear Chief:
You have made a strong case for the holding that
prisoners do not have any justifiable expectations of
privacy, from which it follows that Palmer was not
subjected to a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. That holding, however, does not
dispose of this case.
As you have pointed out in your recent circulation
in Segura, and as the Court heJd in United States v.
' Jacobsen, the Fourth Amendment protects not only
p~rests, but also possessory interests.
1
Hudson not only searchea-Pa mer s property, he then
took and destroyed it. That deprived Palmer of his
possessory interests in the property; under both Segura
and Jacobsen, it was a "§-eizure." Moreover, the
seizure was plainly unreasonable, at least on the
present state of the record. There is no contention
that Palmer's property was contraband; to the contrary
the allegation is that Hudson took and destroyed the
property maliciously, for no reason at all. I cannot
but conclude that taking and destroying property a
prisoner is entitled to have under relevant prison
regulations is an unreasonable seizure prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. In due course I shall circulate
a separate opinion.
fully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

June 4, 1984

82-1630 and 82-6695 Hudson
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Dear Chief:
I agree that John has identified a question that
should be answered, and thi.nk vour proposed addi.tional paragraph is aopropriate.

With this addition, I will be glad to ioin your
opinion. I may possibly ad~ a brief concurring paragraph on
another point.
Sincerely,
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Palmer v. Hudson

John raises an interesting point in his recent
memorandum which may require a short response. I would
propose that we deal with his point either in a short
textual paragraph or a footnote and simply say that the
same reasons that lead us to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches is
inapplicable in a prison cell apply with controlling force
to seizures. Arguably, prison officials could
con~onally deny a prisoner all possessory interests
in material personal possessions during the time of
imprisonment. If so, it follows that . they must be free to
seize from cells whatever articles in their view disserve
legitimate institutional interests, unless a different
constitutional right is thereby implicated.
This power, as with all power, of course is subject
to abuse. That the Fourth Amendment does not protect
against seizures in a prison cell, however, does not mean
that property can be destroyed by officials with impunity.
When all is said and done, this is the · crux of
respondent's complaint; his concern is plainly with the
destruction, not with the seizure and we can concede that
destruction raises a legitimate claim. But, as we have
said, for destruction he has a state remedy, apart from
inmate grievance procedures, which satisfies the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I am ready to add a paragraph to this effect if this
will not cause "defections."
Regards,

!3
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.MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Re:

82-1630)
82-6695)

Hudson v. Palmer
Palmer v. Hudson

John raises an interesting point in his recent
memorandum which may require a short response. I would
propose that we deal with his point either in a short
textual paragraph or a footnote and simply say that the
same reasons that lead us to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches is
inapplicable in a prison cell apply with controlling force
to seizures. Arguably, prison officials could
constitutionally deny a prisoner all possessory interests
in material personal possessions during the time of
imprisonment. If so, it follows that they must be free to
seize from cells whatever articles in their view disserve
legitimate institutional interests, unless a different
constitutional right is thereby implicated.
This power, as with all power, of course is subject
to abuse. That the Fourth Amendment does not protect
against seizures in a prison cell, however, does not mean
that property can be destroyed by officials with impunity.
When all is said and done, this is the crux of
respondent's complaint; his concern is plainly with the
destruction, not with the seizure and we can concede that
destruction raises a legitimate claim. But, as we have
said, for destruction he has a state remedy, apart from
inmate grievance procedures, which satisfies the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I am ready to add a paragraph to this effect if this
will not cause "defections."
Regards,

J
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
Joe

From:
Re:

Nos. 82-1630 & 82-6695 Hudson v. Palmer

1.

~

r~fu
~c');,

You voted with the majority in this case.

In your note

recording your vote you said that the inmate's interest in privacy with respect to property in his cell is "minimal."
ion holds

that a prisoner has no expectation of privacy in his

prison cell.

P. 8.

This seems close enough to your thinking on

this issue to allow you to join the opinion (but see
2.

This opin-

,I

3 below) .

However, you might wish to consider adding a short sepa-

rate opinion noting that the Court does not reach the question of
whether a prisoner has privacy interests in his person that are
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441
recognized
from

the

such

u.s.

520, 563 (1979), you indicated that you

interests

portion

of

In your partial dissent in

for pretrial detainees:

you dissented

the Court's opinion upholding

body cavity

searches because of "the serious intrusion on one's privacy cecasioned by such a search."
ion

There is language in the Court's opin-

in that case that suggests that it also recognized such an

interest.

See id., at 560.

If you wish to write a concurrence

here is sample language:
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
1')4
I join the Court's opinion with the understanding
that it does not reach the question of whether a prisoner has legitimate interests in the privacy of his k6.~
person, as opposed to his property.
Searches and sei- ~~
zures of the person raise considerations that are not
involved in this case.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. ~
520, 563 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting in part); see ~ ~
also id., at 560.
~

~

~-4~

i

3.

______

This op1n1on does not separately address the question of
--------~--.:::-,-~

/( _

~

~estruction

_..._

--""

of resp's property as opposed to mere search of it.

Justice Stevens indicated

in his memo of June 1, 1984, that he

will write separately on this ground.

In his view,

the Fourth

Amendment protects possessory interests as well as privacy interests.

He

prisoner
briefs

will
is

nor

write

entitled
my

bench

that malicious destruction of property a
to

possess

memo

is

unreasonable.

separately

addressed

Neither

destruction

the
of

property as opposed to search, and I do not believe we discussed

J J-

it prior to Conference.

It is, however, an issue that is in the

case:

affidavits on summary judgment clearly ~ ~

the complaint and

mention the destruction of property, and the resp is entitled to
urge affirmance on any ground supported by th~ record. ~
Justice Stevens's view has some appeal.

It is true, as Jus-

tice Stevens says, that this Court has recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects possessory interests.
slip op.

at 14

and n.4 (1983).

(4/2/84);

Brown, 103 s.ct.

Jacobsen,

1535, 1541,

And malicious destruction of noncontraband prop-

erty certainly is
follows.

Texas v.

E.g., us v.

unreasonable ~he

Simply because possessory

-----

argument against JPS is
-interests
- are recognized

as
as

legitimate in the outside world does not mean that they should be
in prisons.

The same reasoning that

justifies not applying the

Fourth Amendment to searches also can be extended to seizures,
although it is a closer case.
quently

mean

seizing

Ferreting out contraband may fre-

prisoners'

property--for later investigation.

property--even

noncontraband

Of course, it is hard to see

how security interests could ever justify destruction of noncon-

I.A.-

£AA..>

But destruction of property is merely an ex-

traband property.

----

treme form of seizure.
feet

See Jacobsen, supra, at 14-15.

is little different than

merely kept the seized goods.

Its ef-

if the prison officials took and
The fact that some seizures may be

unreasonable does not justify a different result; some searches
also may be unreasonable.

The Court's opinion in effect draws a

bright-line or prophylactic rule that all searches and seizures
of

property

are

permissible

in prison.

The proper

remedy

for

destruction of property is a suit under the due process clause
(which would be barred because state procedures provide an adequate remedy) •
Thus, the question is where the Court thinks the line should
be drawn.

Since the rule is essentially a prophylactic one, in-

tended

give

to

prison

authorities

necessary

flexibility,

the

line-drawing depends on how likely it is that seizures will be
unreasonable when compared to the impingement placed on the author i ties'

freedom of action.

The line could be drawn between

searches and seizures on the theory that seizures of noncontraband or questionable contraband are rarely necessary to security.
Or

the line could be drawn between destruction of property and

seizures, since there is almost never any reason to destroy rather

than merely seize noncontraband property.

My

impression is

that barring all Fourth Amendment claims is closest to your views
-- ,.
as expressed after Conference.
This result is supported by another consideration:
ests

in property

are

in prison, all possessory or privacy interdefined

by

administrative

regulation.

I

7

suspect that prisons could bar possession of all property.

•

That

means that allowing any Fourth Amendment claim for

searches or

seizure of property in effect would constitutionalize the administrative

regulations.

Every

violation

would raise a Fourth Amendment question.

of

those

regulations

This seems like a bad

idea to me.
If that is your view,

I think the Court's opinion should be

explicit that its reasoning about searches applies to seizures as
well.

That is not an obvious or a fortiori extension of what the

opinion currently says, and the issue is in the case.
I

recommend either

Therefore,

that you await the dissent and whatever re-

sponse may be forthcoming, or that you join but suggest that the
Chief make a

response to JPS.

A final possibility is that you

circulate a concurrence like that above and say that you may have
something further

to say about the seizure issue after the dis-

sent comes around.

This last seems like the best course to me.

l

I

t

I

.iltpfmtt Clfltllrt ~ tltt 'Jnittb .Jtatt•

JIM~~. <!f. 20.?~'
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 6, 1984

Re:

82-1630 and 82-6695 Hudson v. Palmer
Palmer v. Hudson

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
cpm

'·

.ttqtrtutt <!f.ourt of tqt 'Jnittb ~talt.s'
Jlll.S'lfingtDtt, ~. Of. 2llp'!~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

/
June 6, 1984

No. 82-1630
No. 82-6695

Hudson v. Palmer
Palmer v. Hudson

Dear Chief,
Please J01n me in your opinion. I agree
with you that John's concerns must be addressed;
the privacy rationale which supports your holding
on the search issue does not, without more, respond
to the seizure question.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

iln:prmu QJ01tti &rf tlft ~tb iltatt•
-a.Jringhm. ~. OJ. 20~~~
C HAMSERS Of'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 11, 1984
Re:

Nos. 82-1630 & 82-6695 Hudson v. Palmer

Dear Chief:
Please J01n me, on the assumption that the substance of
your letter of June 4th will be added as a paragraph to the
presently circulating opinion.
I agree that the "seizures" against
which the Fourth Amendment protects are in their nature temporary
deprivations of the right to personally possess property.
When one turns from a "seizure"-which .may deprive the owner
temporarily of the right of immediate possession of an object-to
its destruction, I think one moves from the Fourth Amendment to
the Fifth Amendment.
I cannot imagine a taking of private property
for public use which would be "reasonable" under some sort of
Fourth Amendment analysis, and therefore not violative of the
Fifth Amendment. But as you point out, Virginia provides a remedy
for the destruction of the property.
Sincerely,

~
The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

n

Justice
Justice
'
CHANGES AS MARKED: ~ J /D) }2) I~ //p Justice
Justice
lg
Justice

STYLISTIC CHANGES
From:

Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

The Chief Justice

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated:

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 82-1630

AND

82-6695

TED S. HUDSON, PETITIONER
82-1630

v.
RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR.

RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR., PETITIONER
82-6695
v.
TED S. HUDSON
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari in No. 82-1630 to decide whether a
prison inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.
We also granted certiorari in No. 82-6695, the cross-petition,
to determine whether our decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U. S. 527 (1981), which held that a negligent deprivation of
property by state officials does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if an adequate postdeprivation state remedy exists, should extend to intentional deprivations of property.

I
The facts underlying this dispute are relatively simple.
Respondent Palmer is an inmate at the Bland Correctional
Center in Bland, Va., serving sentences for forgery, uttering, grand larceny, and bank robbery convictions. On September 16, 1981, petitioner Hudson, an officer at the Correc-

JUN 1 5 1984

82-1630 & 82-6695---0PINION
2

HUDSON v. PALMER

tional Center, with a fellow officer, conducted a "shakedown"
search of respondent's prison locker and cell for contraband.
During the "shakedown," the officers discovered a ripped pillowcase in a trashcan near respondent's cell bunk. Charges
against Palmer were instituted under the prison disciplinary
procedures for destroying state property. After a hearing,
Palmer was found guilty on the charge and was ordered to
reimburse the State for the cost of the material destroyed; in
addition, a reprimand was entered on his prison record.
Palmer subsequently brought this prose action in United
States District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Respondent
claimed that Hudson had conducted the shakedown search of
his cell and had brought a false charge against him solely to
harass him, and that, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process of law, Hudson had intentionally destroyed certain of his
noncontraband personal property during the September 16
search. Hudson denied each allegation; he moved for and
was granted summary judgment. The District Court accepted respondent's allegations as true but held nonetheless,
relying on Parratt v. Taylor, supra, that the alleged destruction of respondent's property, even if intentional, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because there were state
tort remedies available to redress the deprivation, App. 31 1
and that the alleged harassment did not "rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation," id., at 32.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded for further proceedings. 697 F. 2d 1220 (CA4
1983). The court affirmed the District Court's holding that
respondent was not deprived of his property without due
process. The court acknowledged that we considered only a
1
The District Court determined that Palmer could proceed against Hudson in state court either for conversion or for detinue, and that under applicable Virginia law, see Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S. E. 2d 369
(1967), Hudson would not be entitled to immunity for the alleged intentional tort.
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claim of negligent property deprivation in Parratt v. Taylor,
supra. It agreed with the District Court, however, that the
logic of Parratt applies equally to unauthorized intentional
deprivations of property by state officials: "[O]nce it is assumed that a postdeprivation remedy can cure an unintentional but negligent act causing injury, inflicted by a state
agent which is unamenable to prior review, then that principle applies as well to random and unauthorized intentional
acts." 697 F. 2d, at 1223. 2 The Court of Appeals did not
discuss the availability and adequacy of existing state law
remedies; it presumably accepted as correct the District
Court's statement of the remedies available under Virginia
law. 3
The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on
respondent's claim that the shakedown search was unreasonable. The court recognized that Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.
520, 555-557 (1979), authorized irregular unannounced shakedown searches of prison cells. But the court held that an individual prisoner has a "limited privacy right" in his cell entitling him to protection against searches conducted solely to
harass or to humiliate. 697 F. 2d, at 1225. 4 The shakedown
2

The Court of Appeals observed that "there is no practical mechanism
by which Virginia could prevent its guards from conducting personal vendettas against prisoners other than by punishing them after the fact .. .. "
697 F . 2d, at 1223.
3
See n. 1, supra.
• Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals' decision rests at least
in part upon a finding of an independent right of privacy for prisoners
under the Fourteenth Amendment alone. Arguably, it is not entirely
clear whether the Court of Appeals believed that the limited privacy right
it recognized was guaranteed solely by the Fourth Amendment, and applicable to the States only through the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether
the right emanated from the Fourteenth Amendment alone, or both. The
court's opinion, however, explicitly speaks to the "primary purpose of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," 697 F. 2d, at 1224, and nowhere
does it suggest an intention to draw a distinction between the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments right of privacy in prison cells. Under the circumstances, we assume, since there is no suggestion to the contrary, that
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of a single prisoner's property, said the court, is permissible
only if "done pursuant to an established program of conducting random searches of single cells or groups of cells reasonably designed to deter or discover the possession of contraband" or upon reasonable belief that the particular prisoner
possessed contraband. I d., at 1224. Because the Court of
Appeals concluded that the record reflected a factual dispute
over whether the search of respondent's cell was routine or
conducted to harass respondent, it held that summary judgment was inappropriate, and that a remand was necessary to
determine the purpose of the cell search.
We granted certiorari. 463 U. S. - - (1983). We affirm
in part and reverse in part.
II
A

The first question we address is whether respondent has a
right of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5 As we have noted, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court's summary judgment in petitioner's favor was premature because respondent had a
"limited privacy right" in his cell that might have been
breached. The court concluded that, to protect this privacy
the court did not mean to imply in this context that any right of privacy
that might exist under the Fourteenth Amendment alone exceeds that that
exists under the Fourth Amendment.
5
The majority of Courts of Appeals have held that a prisoner retains at
least a minimal degree of Fourth Amendment protection in his cell. See
United States v. Chamorro, 687 F. 2d 1 (CAl 1982); United States v.
Hinckley, 217 App. D. C. 2672, 672 F. 2d 115 (1982); United States v.
Lilly, 576 F. 2d 1240 (CA5 1978); United States v. Stumes, 549 F. 2d 831
(CAB 1977); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311 (CA7 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978).
The Second and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply in a prison cell. See United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F. 2d 1107 (CA9 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 916 (1973);
Christman v. Skinner, 468 F. 2d 723 (CA2 1972).
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right, shakedown searches of an individual's cell should be
performed only "pursuant to an established program of conducting random searches
reasonably designed to deter or
discover the possession of contraband" or upon reasonable
belief that the prisoner possesses contraband. Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent had even a limited privacy right in his cell, and
urges that we adopt the "bright line" rule that prisoners have
no legitimate expectation of privacy in their individual cells
that would entitle them to Fourth Amendment protection.
We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the
reach of the Constitution. No "iron curtain" separates one
from the other. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555
(1974). Indeed, we have insisted that prisoners be accorded
those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration. For example, we have held that invidious racial discrimination is as intolerable within a prison as outside, except
as may be essential to "prison security and discipline." Lee
v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) (per curiam). Like others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the
Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a
reasonable right of access to the courts. Johnson v. Avery,
393 u. s. 483 (1969).
They must be provided "reasonable opportunities" to exercise their religious freedom guaranteed under the First
Amendment. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). Similarly, prisoners retain those First Amendment
rights of speech "not inconsistent with [their] status as ...
prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives of
the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817,
822 (1974). They enjoy the protection of due process. Wolff
v. McDonnell, supra; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519
(1972). And the Eighth Amendment ensures that they will
not be subject to "cruel and unusual punishments." Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). The continuing guarantee of
0

,.

0

0
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these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a
belief that the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence of the essential character of
that society.
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many
protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 520, 545.
These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete
withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334
U. S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at
545-546 and cases cited; Wolffv. McDonnell, supra, at 555.
The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical
matter, to accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and
objectives" of prison facilities, Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at
555, chief among which is internal security, see Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 823 (1974). Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders
that, under our system of justice, deterrence, and retribution
are factors in addition to correction.
We have not before been called upon to decide the specific
question whether the Fourth Amendment applies within a
prison cell, 6 but the nature of our inquiry is well defined.
In Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143-144 (1962), a plurality of the
Court termed as "at best a novel argument" the assertion that a prison "is a
place where [one] can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure
of his person, his papers, or his effects." This observation, however, was
plainly dictum. In fact, three Members of the Court specifically dissented
from what they characterized as the Court's "gratuitous exposition of
several grave constitutional issues .... " Id., at 150 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting).
In upholding a room search rule against a Fourth Amendment challenge
by pretrial detainees in Bell v. Woljish, the Court acknowledged the plausibility of an argument that "a person confined in a detention facility has no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that
therefore the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a per6
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We must determine here, as in other Fourth Amendment
contexts, if a "justifiable" expectation of privacy is at stake.
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). The applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether "the person
invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,'
or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded
by government action." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
740 (1979), and cases cited. We must decide, in Justice Harlan's words, whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy in
his prison cell is the kind of expectation that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Katz, supra, at 360, 361
(concurring opinion)." 7
Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we
son." 441 U. S., at 556-557. However, as in Lanza, it was unnecessary
to reach the issue of the Fourth Amendment's general applicability in a
prison cell. We simply assumed arguendo that a pretrial detainee retained at least a "diminished expectation of privacy." !d., at 557.
7
In Katz, Justice Harlan suggested that an expectation of privacy is
"justifiable" if the person concerned has "exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy" and the expectation is one that "society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S., at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court has always emphasized the second of these two requirements. As Justice White said, writing for the plurality in United States v.
White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971), "[o]ur problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular situations may be or the extent to which they may in fact have relied on the discretion of their companions. . . . Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz,
is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable' .... " I d.,
at 751-752. In the same case, even Justice Harlan stressed the controlling
importance of the second of these two requirements: "The analysis must, in
my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations .... [W]e
should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without
examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.'' United States
v. White, 401 U. S., at 745, 768, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court's refusal to adopt a test of "subjective expectation" is understandable; constitutional rights are generally not defined by the subjective
intent of those asserting the rights. The problems inherent in such a
standard are self-evident. See, e. g., Smith v. Maryland, supra, at 740-

..
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hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate
any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might
have in his prison cell and that accordingly, the Fourth '
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does
not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells
simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration
and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have
necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform
their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the
normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a
respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others.
Even a partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our
Nation's prisons illustrates the magnitude of the problem.
During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120
prisoners murdered by fellow inmates in state and federal
prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by
prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar disturbances were reported in these facilities for the same time
frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these institutions. See Prison Violence 7 Corrections Compendium
(Mar. 1983). Additionally, informal statistics from the U. S.
Bureau of Prisons show that in the federal system during
1983, there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on
other inmates, 227 inmate assaults on prison staff, and 10 suicides. There were in the same system in 1981 and 1982 over
750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570 inmate assaults on prison personnel.
741 , n. 5.
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Within this volatile "community," prison administrators
are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only
the prison staffs and administrative personnel, but visitors.
They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must
be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is
one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they
must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons
into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots,
in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the
schemes materialize. In addition to these monumental
tasks, it is incumbent upon these officials at the same time to
maintain as sanitary an environment for the inmates as feasible, given the difficulties of the environment.
The administration of a prison, we have said, is "at best an
extraordinarily difficult undertaking." Wolffv. McDonnell,
418 U. S., at 566; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, - (1983). But it would be literally impossible to accomplish the
prison objectives identified above if inmates retained a right
of privacy in their cells. Virtually the only place inmates can
conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband is in their
cells. Unfettered access to these cells by prison officials,
thus, is imperative if drugs and contraband are to be
ferretted out and sanitary surroundings are to be maintained.
Determining whether an expectation of privacy is "legitimate" or "reasonable" necessarily entails a balancing of interests. The two interests here, of course, are the interest of
society in the security of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his cell, which is already
limited by the exigencies of the circumstances. We strike
the balance in favor of institutional security, which we have
noted is "central to all other corrections goals," Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U. S., at 823. A right of privacy in tradi-
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tional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and
their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. 8 We are satisfied that society would insist that
the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what
must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security; a prison "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a
home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room." Lanza v.
New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143-144 (1962). We believe that it
is accepted by our society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and
privacy are inherent incidents of confinement." Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. 8., at 537.
The Court of Appeals was troubled by the possibility of
searches conducted solely to harass inmates; it reasoned that
a requirement that searches be conducted only pursuant to
an established policy or upon reasonable suspicion would prevent such searches to the maximum extent possible. Of
course, there is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and
of course, intentional harassment of even the most hardened
criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society. However, we disagree with the court's proposed solution. The
uncertainty that attends random searches of cells renders
these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the
Respondent contends also that the destruction of his personal property
constituted an unreasonable seizure of that property violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Assuming that the Fourth Amendment protects
against the destruction of property, in addition to its mere seizure, the
same reasons that lead us to conclude that the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches is inapplicable in a prison cell,
apply with controlling force to seizures. Prison officials must be free to
seize from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institutional interests.
That the Fourth Amendment does not protect against seizures in a
prison cell does not mean that an inmate's property can be destroyed with
impunity. We note, for example, that even apart from inmate grievance
procedures, see n. 9, infra, respondent has adequate state remedies for
the alleged destruction of his property. See discussion infra, at 16-18.
8
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prison administrator in the constant fight against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit drugs, and other contraband. The Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged that
"the device [of random cell searches] is of ... obvious utility
in achieving the goal of prison security." 697 F. 2d, at 1224.
A requirement that even random searches be conducted
pursuant to an established plan would seriously underririne
the effectiveness of this weapon. It is naive to believe that
prisoners would not eventually decipher any plan officials
might devise for "planned random searches," and thus be
able routinely to anticipate searches. The Supreme Court of
Virginia identified the shortcomings of an approach such as
that adopted by the Court of Appeals and the necessity of allowing prison administrators flexibility:
"For one to advocate that prison searches must be conducted only pursuant to an enunciated general policy or
when suspicion is directed at a particular inmate is to ignore the realities of prison operation. Random searches
of inmates, individually or collectively, and their cells
and lockers are valid and necessary to ensure the security of the institution and the safety of inmates and all
others within its boundaries. This type of search allows
prison officers flexibility and prevents inmates from
anticipating, and thereby thwarting, a search for contraband." Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 754, 757,
284 S. E. 2d 809, 811 (1981).
We share the concerns so well expressed by the Supreme
Court and its view that wholly random searches are essential
to the effective security of penal institutions. We, therefore, cannot accept even the concededly limited holding of the
Court of Appeals.
Respondent acknowledges that routine shakedowns of
prison cells are essential to the effective administration of
prisons. Brief for Respondent 7, n. 5. He contends, however, that he is constitutionally entitled not to be subjected to
searches conducted only to harass. The crux of his claim is
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that "because searches and seizures to harass are unreasonable, a prisoner has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to
have his cell, locker, personal effects, person invaded for
such a purpose." Brief for Respondent 24. This argument,
which assumes the answer to the predicate question whether
a prisoner has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
prison cell at all, is merely a challenge to the reasonableness
of the particular search of respondent's cell. Because we
conclude that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unrea- \
sonable searches does not apply in prison cells, we need not
address this issue.
Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections
of the Fourth Amendment does not mean that he is without a
remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.
Nor does it mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod
over inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth
Amendment always stands as a protection against "cruel and
unusual punishments." By the same token, there are adequate state tort and common-law remedies available to respondent to redress the alleged destruction of his personal
property. See discussion infra, at 16-18. 9
B
In his complaint in the District Court, in addition to his
claim that the shakedown search of his cell violated his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights, respondent alleged under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 that petitioner intentionally destroyed certain of his personal property during the
search. This destruction, respondent contended, deprived
him of property without due process, in violation of the Due
The Commonwealth has a new inmate grievance procedure that was
effective as of October 12, 1982, see n. 14, infra. But it appears that at
the time of the alleged deprivation of respondent's property, a very similar
procedure was in effect that would also have afforded respondent relief for
any destruction of his property. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 14.
9

· 82-1630 & 82-6695-0PINION
HUDSON v. PALMER

13

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District
Court dismissed this portion of respondent's complaint for
failure to state a claim. Reasoning under Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U. S. 527 (1981), it held that even an intentional destruction of property by a state employee does not violate due
process if the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation
remedy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The question presented for our review in Palmer's cross-petition is whether
our decision in Parratt v. Taylor should extend, as the Court
of Appeals held, to intentional deprivations of property by
state employees acting under color of state law. 10
In Parratt v. Taylor, a state prisoner sued prison officials
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that their negligent loss of
a hobby kit he ordered from a mail-order catalogue deprived
him of property without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had affirmed the District Court's summary
judgment in the prisoner's favor. We reversed, holding that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
violated when a state employee negligently deprives an individual of property, provided that the State makes available a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy. 11
We viewed our decision in Parratt as consistent with prior
cases recognizing that
1
°Four Circuits, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in this
case, have held that Parratt extends to intentional deprivations of property. See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F. 2d 864 (CA7 1983); Engblom v.
Carey, 677 F. 2d 957 (CA2 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents,
660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981), aff'd sub nom. Rutledge v. Kush, 460 U. S.
(1983). Three Circuits have held that it does not. Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F. 2d 387 (CA5 1982); Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F. 2d 1320 (CA9
1982); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F. 2d 868 (CA7 1981).
11
Nebraska had provided respondent with a tort remedy for his alleged
property deprivation. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,209 et seq. (1976). We held
that this remedy was entirely adequate to satisfy due process, even
though we recognized that it might not provide respondent all the relief to
which he might have been entitled under § 1983. 451 U. S. , at 543-544.
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"either the necessity of quick action by the State or the
impracticability of providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some
meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of
the State's action at some time after the initial taking
. . . satisf[ies] the requirements of procedural due process." 451 U. S., at 539 (footnote omitted).
We reasoned that where a loss of property is occasioned by a
random, unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than
by an established state procedure, the state cannot predict
when the loss will occur. Id., at 541. Under these circumstances, we observed:
"[It]t is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes
place. The loss of property, although attributable to the
State as action under 'color of law,' is in almost all cases
beyond the control of the State. Indeed, in most cases
it is not only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a
meaningful hearing before the deprivation." Ibid. 12
Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed our holding in Parratt in
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982), in
the course of holding that postdeprivation remedies do not
satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused
by conduct pursuant to established state procedure, rather
than random and unauthorized action. 13
12
In reaching our conclusion in Parratt, we expressly relied on thenJudge Stevens' opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517
F. 2d 1311 (1975), modified en bane, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435
U. S. 932 (1978), holding that, where an individual has been negligently deprived of property by a state employee, the State's action is not complete
unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss. 451 U. S., at 541-542.
13
In Logan, we examined a claim that the terms of an Illinois statute
deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to pursue his employment discrimination claim. We specifically distinguished the case from Parratt by
noting that "Parratt ... was dealing with a ... 'random and unauthorized
act by a state employee ... [and was] not a result of some established state
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While Parratt is necessarily limited by its facts to negligent deprivations of property, it is evident, as the Court of
Appeals recognized, that its reasoning applies as well to intentional deprivations of property. The underlying rationale
of Parratt is that when deprivations of property are effected
through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable"
since the state cannot know when such deprivations will
occur. We can discern no logical distinction between negligent and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the
"practicability" of affording predeprivation process is concerned. The State can no more anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its
employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct.
Arguably, intentional acts are even more difficult to anticipate because one bent on intentionally depriving a person of
his property might well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling his intent.
If negligent deprivations of property do not violate the Due
Process Clause because predeprivation process is impracticable, it follows that intentional deprivations do not violate
that Clause provided, of course, that adequate state postdeprivation remedies are available. Accordingly, we hold
that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a
state employee does not constitute a violation of the proce-1
dural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy
for the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent
deprivations of property by state employees, the State's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to
procedure.'" 455 U.S., at 435-436 (quoting Parratt, supra, at 541).
Parratt, we said, "was not designed to reach ... a situation" where the
deprivation is the result of an established state procedure. 455 U. S., at
436.
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provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy. 14
Respondent presses two arguments that require at least
brief comment. First, he contends that, because an agent of
the state who intends to deprive a person of his property
"can provide predeprivation process, then as a matter of due
process he must do so." Brief for Respondent 8 (emphasis in
original). This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Parratt. There we held that postdeprivation
procedures satisfy due process because the State cannot possibly know in advance of a negligent deprivation of property.
Whether an individual employee himself is able to foresee a
deprivation is simply of no consequence. The controlling inquiry is solely whether the State is in a position to provide for
loMc~:Sto,J
predeprivation process.
Respondent also contends, citing to Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., supra, that the deliberate destruction of his
property by petitioner constituted a due process violation despite the availability of postdeprivation remedies. Ibid. In
Logan, we decided a question about which our decision in
Parratt left little doubt, that is, whether a postdeprivation
state remedy satisfies due process where the property deprivation is effected pursuant to an established state procedure.
We held that it does not. Logan plainly has no relevance
here. Respondent does not even allege that the asserted
destruction of his property occurred pursuant to a state
procedure.
Having determined that Parratt extends to intentional
deprivations of property, we need only decide whether the
Commonwealth of Virginia provides respondent an adequate
14

Our holding that an intentional deprivation of property does not give
rise to a violation of the Due Process Clause if the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy was foreshadowed by our discussion of
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), in Parratt. We noted that our
analysis was "quite consistent" with that in Ingraham, a case that, we observed, involved intentional conduct on behalf of state officials. 451 U. S.,
at 542.
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postdeprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of his
property. Both the District Court and, at least implicitly,
the Court of Appeals held that several common-law remedies
available to respondent would provide adequate compensation for his property loss. We have no reason to question
that determination, particularly given the speculative nature
of respondent's arguments.
Palmer does not seriously dispute the adequacy of the existing state-law remedies themselves. He asserts in this respect only that, because certain of his legal papers allegedly
taken "may have contained things irreplacable [sic], and
incompensable" or "may also have involved sentimental items
which are of equally intangible value," Brief for Respondent
10-11, n. 10, a suit in tort, for example, would not "necessarily" compensate him fully. If the loss is "incompensable,"
this is as much so under§ 1983 as it would be under any other
remedy. In any event, that Palmer might not be able to recover under these remedies the full amount which he might
receive in a § 1983 action is not, as we have said, determinative of the adequacy of the state remedies. See Parratt,
supra, at 544.
Palmer contends also that relief under applicable state law
"is far from certain and complete" because a state court
might hold that petitioner, as a state employee, is entitled to
sovereign immunity. Brief for Respondent 11. This suggestion is unconvincing. The District Court and the Court of
Appeals held that respondent's claim would not be barred by
sovereign immunity. As the District Court noted, under
Virginia law, "a State employee may be held liable for his intentional torts," Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 19, 155 S. E.
2d 369, 372-373 (1967); see also Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53,
255 S. E. 2d 479 (1979). Indeed, respondent candidly acknowledges that it is "probable that a Virginia trial court
would rule that there should be no immunity bar in the
present case." Brief for Respondent 14.
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Respondent attempts to cast doubt on the obvious breadth
of Elder through the naked assertion that "the phrase 'may
be held liable' could have meant ... only the possibility of liability under certain circumstances rather than a blanket rule
" I d., at 13. We are equally unpersuaded by this
speculation. The language of Elder is unambiguous that employees of the Commonwealth do not enjoy sovereign immunity for their intentional torts, and Elder has been so read by
a number of federal courts, as respondent concedes, see Brief
for Respondent 13, n. 13. See, e. g., Holmes v. Wampler,
546 F. Supp. 500, 504 (ED Va. 1982); Irshad v. Spann, 543 F.
Supp. 922, 928 (ED Va. 1982); Frazier v. Collins, 544 F.
Supp. 109, 110 (ED Va. 1982); Whorley v. Karr, 534 F. Supp.
88, 89 (WD Va. 1981); Daughtry v. Arlington County, Va.,
490 F. Supp. 307 (DC 1980). 15 In sum, it is evident here, as
in Parratt, that the State has provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of property.

III
We hold that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability \
to a prison cell. We hold also that, even if petitioner intentionally destroyed respondent's personal property during the
challenged shakedown search, the destruction did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment since the Commonwealth of Virginia has provided respondent an adequate postdeprivation
remedy.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing and remanding the District Court's judgment on respond15
It is noteworthy that the Commonwealth has enacted the State Tort
Claims Act, Va. Code §§ 8.01-195.1 et seq. (Supp. 1983), which, in defined
circumstances, waives sovereign immunity. Additionally, as of October
12, 1982, the State has in place an inmate grievance procedure that received the certification of the Attorney General of the United States as in
compliance with the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U. S. C.§ 1997e. Although apparently neither of these avenues was open
to this respondent, both are potential sources of relief for persons in respondent's position in the future.
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ent's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments claim is reversed.
The judgment affirming the District Court's decision that respondent has not been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

White
Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
O'Connor

From:

Justice Stevens

Circulated: _ __,J=U=N.:......=..l..:;_8--=--19:.._:8_4_ _
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 82-1630 AND 82-6695

TED S. HUDSON, PETITIONER

82-1630

v.
RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR.

RUSSELL THOMAS PALMER, JR., PETITIONER
82-6695
v.
TED S. HUDSON
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

This case comes to us on the pleadings. We must take the
allegations in Palmer's complaint as true. 1 Liberally construing this pro se complaint as we must, 2 it alleges that
after examining it, prison guard Hudson maliciously took and
destroyed a quantity of Palmer's property, including legal
materials and letters, for no reason other than harassment. 3
1
See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 515-516
(1972); Walker Process Equipment Co. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 174-175 (1965); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964)
(per curiam).
2
See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U. S. 364 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
8
"On 9-16-81 around 5:50 p.m., officer Hudson shook down my locker
and destroyed a lot of my property, i. e.: legal materials, letters, and other
personal property only as a means of harassment. Officer Hudson has violated my Constitutional rights. The shakedown was no routine shakedown. It was planned and carried out only as harassment. Hudson
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For the reasons stated in Part II-B of the opinion of the
Court, I agree that Palmer's complaint does not allege a violation of his constitutional right to procedural due process. 4
The reasoning in Part II-A of the Court's opinion, however,
is seriously flawed-indeed, internally inconsistent. The
Court correctly concludes that the imperatives of prison administration require random searches of prison cells, and also
correctly states that in the prison context "[o]f course, there
is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and of course, intentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals
cannot be tolerated by a civilized society." Ante, at 10.
But the Court then holds that no matter how malicious, destructive or arbitrary a cell search and seizure may be, it cannot constitute an unreasonable invasion of any privacy or possessory interest that society is prepared to recognize. Ante,
at 8.
Measured by the conditions that prevail in a free society,
neither the possessions nor the slight residuum of privacy
that a prison inmate can retain in his cell, can have more than
the most minimal value. From the standpoint of the prisoner, however, that trivial residuum may mark the difference
between slavery and humanity. On another occasion, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE wrote:
stated the next time he would really mess my stuff up. I have plenty of
witnesses to these facts." App. 7-8.
'I join Part 11-B of the opinion of the Court on the understanding that it
simply applies the holding of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), to the
facts of this case. I do not understand the Court's holding to apply to conduct that violates a substantive constitutional right-actions governmental
officials may not take no matter what procedural protections accompany
them, see Parratt, 451 U. S., at 545 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring); see also
id., at 552-553 (POWELL, J., concurring in result); or to cases in which it is
contended that the established prison procedures themselves create an unreasonable risk that prisoners will be unjustifiably deprived of their property, see id., at 543; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S.
422, 435-436 (1982).
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"It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are
lawfully confined, but they do not lose all civil rights.
Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutional retain
certain fundamental rights of privacy; they are not like
animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by
the public or by media reporters, however 'educational'
the process may be for others." Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 5, n. 2 (1978) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
·
Personal letters, snapshots of family members, a souvenir,
a deck of cards, a hobby kit, perhaps a diary or a training
manual for an apprentice in a new trade, or even a Bible-a
variety of inexpensive items may enable a prisoner to maintain contact with some part of his past and an eye to the possibility of a better future. Are all of these items subject to
unrestrained perusal, confiscation or mutilation at the hands
of a possibly hostile guard? Is the Court correct in its perception that "society'' is not prepared to recognize any privacy or possessory interest of the prison inmate-no matter
how remote the threat to prison security may be?
I

Even if it is assumed that Hudson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in most of the property at issue in this case
because it could be inspected at any time, that does not mean
he was without Fourth Amendment protection. 5 For the
Fourth Amendment protects Palmer's possessory interests
5

Though I am willing to assume that for purposes of this case that the
Court's holding concerning most of Palmer's privacy interests is correct,
that should not be taken as an endorsement of the Court's new "bright line"
rule that a prisoner can have no expecation of privacy in his papers or effects, ante, at 5. I cannot see any justification for applying this rule to
minimum security facilities in which inmates who pose no realistic threat to
security are housed. I also see no justification for reading the mail of a
prisoner once it has cleared whatever censorship mechanism is employed
by the prison and has been received by the prisoner.
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in this property entirely apart from whatever privacy interest he may have in it.
"The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides
that the 'right of the people to be secure in their prsons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ' This
text protects two kinds of expectations, one involving
'searches,' the other 'seizures.' A 'search' occurs when
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property."
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. - - , - - (1984)
(footnotes omitted). 6
There can be no doubt that the complaint adequately alleges a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Palmer was completely deprived of his possessory interests in his property; by taking and destroying it, Hudson
was asserting "dominion and control" over it in the most fundamental sense; hence his conduct "did constitute a seizure,"
id., at - - . 7 The fact that the property was destroyed
hardly alters the analysis-the possessory interests the
Fourth Amendment protects are those of the citizen. From
the citizen's standpoint, it makes no difference what the government does with his property once it takes it from him; he
is just as much deprived of his possessory interests when it is
destroyed as when it is merely taken. This very Term, in
Jacobsen, we squarely held that destruction of property in a
field test for cocaine constituted a constitutionally cognizable
interference with possessory interests: "[T]he field test did
See also Segura v. United States, ante, at (opinion of BURGER,
C. J.); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. (1982); id., a t - (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result); Texas v. Brown, 460 U . S . - , - (1983)
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
7
See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 574-575 (1979) (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting).
6
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affect respondents' possessory interests protected by the
[Fourth] Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the
powder it converted what had been only a temporary deprivation of possessory interests into a permanent one." I d., at
The Court suggests that "the interest of society in the security of its penal insitututions" precludes prisoners from
having any legitimate possessory interests. Ante, at 9-10
and n. ·8. 8 That contention is fundamentally wrong for at
least two reasons.
First, Palmer's possession of the material was entirely legitimate as a matter of state law. There is no contention
that the material seized was contraband or that Palmer's possession of it was in any way inconsistent with applicable
prison regulations. Hence, he had an entirely legitimate
right to possess it. In fact, the Court's analysis of Palmer's
possessory interests is at odds with its treatment of his Due
Process claim. In Part 11-B of its opinion, the Court holds
that the material which Hudson took and destroyed was
"property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Ante, at 15-16. Indeed, this holding is compelled by Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), in which we held that a
$23.50 hobby kit which had been mail ordered but not received by a prisoner was "property" within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause. See id., at 536. 9 However, an in8

The existence of state remedies for this seizure, to which the Court adverts ante, at 10, n. 8, is of course irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment
question, since 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations supplemental to any state remedy that may exist. M onroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961). See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v.
McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 104 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 99
(1980); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 710, n. 5 (1976); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam); McNeese v. Board of
Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-674 (1963). See also n. 4, supra.
9
0n this point, the Court was unanimous, see 451 U. S., at 546-548
(POWELL, J., concurring in result), as it is today.
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terest cannot qualify as "property" within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause unless it amounts to a legitimate claim of
entitlement. 10 Thus in Part li-B of its opinion the Court
necessarily indicates that Palmer had a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the material at issue. It is well-settled that
once a State creates such a constitutionally protected interest, the Constitution forbids it from depriving even a prisoner of such an interest arbitrarily. 11 Thus, Palmer had alegitimate right under both state law and the Due Process
Clause to possess the material at issue. That being the case,
the Court's own analysis indicates that ·Palmer had a legitimate possessory interest in the material within the Fourth
Amendment's proscription on unreasonable seizures.
Second, the most significant of Palmer's possessory interests are protected as a matter of substantive constitutional
law, entirely apart from the legitimacy of those interests
under state law or the Due Process Clause. The Eighth
Amendment forbids "cruel and unusual punishments." Its
proscriptions are measured by society's "evolving standards
of decency," Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 346-347
(1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102-103 (1977). The
Court's implication that prisoners have no possessory interests that by virtue of the Fourth Amendment are free from
State interference cannot, in my view, be squared with the
Eighth Amendment. To hold that a prisoner's possession of
See, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., ante, at - ; Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 430-431 (1982); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 161 (1980); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 7 (1979); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438,
441-443 (1979) (per curiam); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 344 and nn.
6-7 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 165-166 (1974) (POWELL, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in result in part); id. , at 185 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 207-208 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972).
11
See Hewitt v. Helms , 459 U. S . - , - (1983); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates , 442 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1979); Wolffv. McDonnell, 418
10

u. s. 539, 556-558 (1974).

)
(
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a letter from his wife, or a picture of his baby, has no protection against arbitrary or malicious seizure and destruction
would not, in my judgment, comport with any civilized standard of decency.
There are other substantive constitutional rights that also
shed light on the legitimacy of Palmer's possessory interests.
The complaint alleges that the material at issue includes letters and legal materials. This Court has held the First
Amendment entitles a prisoner to receive and send mail, subject only to the institution's right to censor letters or withhold delivery if necessary to protect institutional security,
and if accompanied by procedural safeguards. 12 We have
also held that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a prisoner
to reasonable access to legal materials as a corollary of the
constitutional right of access to the courts. 13 Thus, these
substantive constitutional rights affirmatively protect Palmer's right to possess the material in question free from state
interference. It is therefore beyond me how that Court can
question the legitimacy of Palmer's possessory interests
which were so clearly infringed by Hudson's alleged conduct.
II
Once it is concluded that Palmer has adequately alleged a
"seizure," the question becomes whether the seizure was "unreasonable." Questions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness can be resolved only by balancing the intrusion on constitutionally protected interests against the law enforcement
interests justifying the challenged conduct. 14
12
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974). A prisoner's possession of other types of personal property relating to religious observance,
such as a Bible or a crucifix, is surely protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. See Cruz v. Beta, 405 U. S. 319, 322, n.
2 (1972) (per curiam).
13
See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817 (1977).
14
See, e. g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S., a t - ; Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
,(1983); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. ,(1983); Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 559 (1979).
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It is well-settled that the discretion accorded prison officials is not absolute. 15 A prisoner retains those constitutional rights not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives. 16 There can be no penological justification for the
seizure alleged here. There is no contention that Palmer's
property posed any threat to institutional security. Hudson
had already examined the material before he took and destroyed it. The allegation is that Hudson did this for no rea15
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 562 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U. S. 396, 405-406 (1974); Cruz v. Beta, 405 U. S. 319, 321-322 (1972)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 319, 321-322 (1972) (per
curiam). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 352 (1981); id., at
368-369 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U. S. 97, 102-105 (1976); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843,
866-870 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
16
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 545-547 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125, 129 (1977); Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817,
822 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 412-414 (1974). No
precedent of this Court indicates that this general principle is inapplicable
to the Fourth Amendment. As the Court acknowledges, statements concerning the application of the Fourth Amendment to prisons in Lanza v.
New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143-144 (1962), were dicta and were not joined
by a majority of the Court. See ante, at 6-7, n. 6. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520 (1979), the Court explicitly reserved questions concerning prisoners' expectations of privacy and the seizure and destruction of prisoners'
property. See id., at 556-557 and n. 38. In United States v. Edwards,
415 U. S. 800 (1974), we approved "no more than taking from [an arrestee]
the effects in his immediate possession that constituted evidence of a
crime," id., at 805, and reserved decision on the question presented here,
see id., at 808, n. 9. Conversely, when this Court last confronted the
question decided today, it took it as given that the seizure of a prisoner's
letters was subject to the Fourth Amendment:
"[T]he letters were voluntarily written, no threat or coercion was used to
obtain them, nor were they seized without process. They came into the
possession of the officials of the penitentiary under established practice,
reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the institution. Under
such circumstances there was neither testimony required of the accused,
nor unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his constitutional
rights." Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 21-22 (1919).
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son save spite; there is no contention that under prison regulations the material was contraband, and in any event as I
have indicated above the Constitution prohibits a State from
treating letters and legal materials as contraband. The
Court agrees that intentional harassment of prisoners by
guards is intolerable, ante, at 10. That being the case, there
is no room for any conclusion but that the alleged seizure was
unreasonable. The need for "close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells," ante, at 10, in no way justifies taking and destroying noncontraband property; if material is examined and found not to be contraband, there can be
no justification for its seizure. When, as here, the material
at issue is not contraband it simply makes no sense to say
that its seizure and destruction serves "legitimate institutional interests." Ante, at 10, n. 8. Such seizures are
unreasonable.
The Court's holding is based on its belief that society would
not recognize as reasonable the possessory interests of prisoners. Its perception of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is not based on any empirical data; rather
it merely reflects the perception of the five Justices who have
joined the opinion that THE CHIEF JUSTICE has authored.
On the question of what seizures society is prepared to consider reasonable, surely the consensus on that issue in the
lower courts is of some signficance. Virtually every federal
judge to address the question over the past decade has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does apply to a prison
cell. 17 There is similar unanimity among the comentators. 18
17

The Circuits which have addressed this question are unanimous. See,

e. g., Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F. 2d 766, 769 (CA8 1984), cert. pending, No.
83-6722; United States v. Mills, 704 F. 2d 1553, 1560-1561 (CAll 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U. S . - (1984); United States v. Chamorro, 687 F. 2d
1, 4-5 (CAl), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1043 (1982); United States v.
Hinckley, 672 F. 2d 115, 128-132 (CADC 1982); United States v. Lilly, 576
F. 2d 1240, 1245-1246 (CA5 1978); United States v. Ready, 574 F. 2d 1009,
1013-1014 (CAlO 1978); United States v. Stumes , 549 F. 2d 831 (CA8 1977)
(per curiam); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311, 1315-1317 (CA7 1975),

,.
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The Court itself acknowledges that "intentional harassment
of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a
civilized society." Ante, at 10. That being the case, I fail to
see how a seizure that serves no purpose except harassment
does not invade an interest that society considers reasonable,
and that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The Court rests its view of "reasonableness" almost entirely upon its assessment of the security needs of prisons.
Ante, at 8-10. Because deference to institutional needs is so
critical to the Court's approach, it is worth inquiring as to the
view prison adminstrators take toward conduct of the type at
issue here. On that score the Court demonstrates a remarkmodified on other grounds, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435
U. S. 932 (1978); Bethea v. Harris , 476 F . 2d 292 (CAlO), cert. denied, 414
U. S. 872 (1973). The Court claims that the Second and Ninth Circuits
have reached a conclusion in accord with its own, see ante, at 4, n. 5, but
both of the decisions it cites predated Wolff. Prior to Wolff many courts
thought that no judicial review of prison conditions was possible. See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110
U. Pa. L. Rev. 985 (1962); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique
of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L. J. 506
(1963). It is now the law in both Circuits that the Fourth Amendment
protects prisoners against searches and seizures not reasonably related to
institutional needs. See Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F. 2d 34, 35 (CA2 1983)
(per curiam); DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F. 2d 602, 605 (CA2 1983); United
States v. Vallez, 653 F. 2d 403, 406 (CA9), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 904
(1981); Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F. 2d 763 (CA2 1975); United States v. Dawson, 516 F . 2d 796, 805-806 (CA9), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 855 (1976); Hansen v. May, 502 F. 2d 728, 730 (CA9 1974); United States v. Savage, 482 F.
2d 1371, 1372-1373 (CA9 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 932 (1974).
18
See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 23-6.10 Commentary (2d ed.
1980); Gianelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the
Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1045
(1976); Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degredation Process in Our Prisons, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 669 (1972); Note, Constitutional
Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1033,
1043-1055 (1982); Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California Prisons
after Delancie v. Superior Court: Civil Liberty or Civil Death?, 22 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 1109 (1982).
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able lack of awareness as to what penologists and correctional
officials consider "legitimate institutional interests." I am
unaware that any responsible prison administrator has ever
contended that there is a need to take and destroy noncontraband property of prisoners; the Court certainly provides
no evidence to support its conclusion that institutions require
this sort of power. To the contrary, it appears to be the
near-universal view of correctional officials that guards
should neither seize nor destroy noncontraband property.
For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons' regulations
state that only items which may not be possessed by a prisoner can be seized by prison officials, see 28 CFR §§ 553.12,
553.13 (1983). They also provide that prisoners can retain
property consistent with prison management, specifically including clothing, legal materials, hobbycraft materials,
comissary items, radios and watches, correspondence, reading materials, and personal photos. 19 Virginia law and its
Department of Corrections' regulations similarly authorize
seizure of contraband items alone. 20 I am aware of no prison
system with a different practice; 21 the standards for prison
19
See 28 CFR §§ 553.10, 553.11 (1983). The regulations also state: "Staff
conducting the search shall leave the housing or work area as nearly as
practicable in its original order." I d. § 552.13(b). See also United States
Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails § 13.01 (1980)
("Written policy and procedure specify the personal property inmates can
retain in their possession. . . . It should be made clear to inmates what
personal property they may retain, and inmates should be assured both
that the facility's policies are applied uniformly and that their property will
be stored safely").
20
See Va. Code § 53.1-26 (1982) ("Any item of person property which a
prisoner in any state correctional facility is prohibited from possessing by
the Code of Virginia or by the rules of the Director shall, when found in the
possession of a prisoner, be confiscated and sold or destroyed"); Virginia
Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Services, Guideline No. 411
(Sept. 16, 1983).
21
For example, the Illinois regulation considered in Bonner v. Coughlin,
517 F . 2d 1311 (CA71975), modified on other grounds, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976)
(en bane), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978), provided: "It is important and

,.
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administration which have been promulgated for correctional
institutions invariably require prison officials to respect prisoners' possessory rights in noncontraband personal
property. 22
Depriving inmates of any residuum of privacy or possessory rights is in fact plainly contrary to institutional goals.
Sociologists recognize that prisoners deprived of any sense of
individuality devalue themselves and others and therefore
are more prone to violence toward themselves or others. 23
At the same time, such an approach undermines the rehabilitative function of the institution: "Without the privacy and
dignity provided by fourth amendment coverage, an inmate's
opportunity to reform, small as it may be, will further be diminished. It is anomalous to ·provide a prisoner with rehabilitative programs and services in an effort to build selfrespect while simultaneously subjecting him to unjustified
and degrading searches and seizures." Gianelli & Gilligan,
Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1045,
1069 (1976).
To justify its conclusion, the Court recites statistics concerning the number of crimes that occur within prisons. For
example, it notes that over an 18-month period approximately 120 prisoners were murdered in state and federal facilities. Ante, at 8. At the end of 1983 there were 438,830
essential that searches be systematic and do not result in damage, loss, or
abuse to any inmate's personal property. Deliberately damaging, confiscating, or abusing any inmate's permitted personal property will result
in disciplinary action against the offending employee." Id., at 1314, n. 6.
22
See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 23-6.10 (2d Ed. 1980); American Correctional Association, Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions 2-4192 (2d ed. 1981); National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Standards and Goals, Corrections 2. 7 (1973).
23
A summary of the literature is found in Schwartz, Deprivation of Privacy as a "Functional Prerequisite": The Case of the Prison, 63 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 229 (1972).
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inmates in state and federal prisons. 24 The Court's homicide
rate of 80 per year yields an annual prison homicide rate of
18.26 persons per 100,000 inmates. In 1982, the homicide
rate in Miami was 51.98 per 100,000; in New York it was
23.50 per 100,000; in Dallas 31.53 per 100,000; and in the District of Columbia 30.70 per 100,000. 25 Thus, the prison homicide rate, it turns out, is significantly lower than that in many
of our major cities. I do not suggest this type of analysis
provides a standard for measuring the reasonableness of a
search or seizure within prisons, but I do suggest that the
Court's use of statistics is less than persuasive. 26
The size of the inmate population also belies the Court's hypothesis that all prisoners fit into a violent, incorrigible stereotype. Many, of course, become recidivists. But literally
thousands upon thousands of former prisoners are now leading constructive law-abiding lives. 27 The nihilistic tone of the
Court's opinion-seemingly assuming that all prisoners have
demonstrated an inability "to conform and control their be24
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1983 (U. S. Dept. of Justice
April 1984).
211
See United States Department of Justice, Crime in the United States
51, 65, 70, 92 (1983).
26
The size of the prison population also sheds light on what society may
consider reasonable with respect to the property and privacy of prisoners.
When one recognizes that the prison population is constantly changing and
that most inmates have family or friends who retain an interest in their
well-being, one must acknowledge that millions of citizens may well believe
that prisoners should retain some residuum of privacy and possessory
rights.
27
The Court's portrayal of the stereotypical prison inmate entirely overlooks the wide range of individuals who actually have served and do serve
time in the prison system. It ignores, for example, the conscientious objectors who refuse to register for the draft, and the corporate executives
who have been convicted of violating securities, antitrust or tax laws,
union leaders, former White House aides, former governors, judges, and
legilsators, famous writers and sports heroes, and many thousands who
have committed serious offenses but for whom crime is by no means a way
of life.
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havior to the legitimates standards of society by the normal
impulses of self-restraint," ante, at 8, is consistent with its
conception of prisons as sterile warehouses, but not with an
enlightened view of the function of a modern prison system. 28
In the final analysis, however, any deference to institutional needs is totally undermined by the fact that Palmer's
property was not contraband. If Palmer were allowed to
possess the property, then there can be no contention that
any institutional need or policy justified the seizure and destruction of the property. Once it is agreed that random
searches of a prisoner's cell are reasonable to ensure that the
cell contains no contraband, there can be no need for seizure
and destruction of noncontraband items found during such
searches. To accord prisoners any less protection is to declare that the prisoners are entitled to no measure of human
dignity or individuality-not a photo, a letter, nor anything
except standard-issue prison clothing would be free from arbitrary seizure and destruction. Yet that is the view the
Court takes today. It declares prisoners to be little more
I cannot help but think that the Court's holding is influenced by an unstated fear that if it recognizes that prisoners have any Fourth Amendment protection this will lead to a flood of frivolous lawsuits. Of course,
this type of burden is not sufficient to justify a judicial modification of the
requirements of law. See Tower v. Glover, ante, at--; Patsy v. Florida
Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 512, n. 13 (1982). "Frivolous cases
should be treated as exactly that, and not as occasions for fundamental
shifts in legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for
speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if they are inadequate to protect
[defendants] from vexatious litigation, then there is something wrong with
those procedures, not with the [Fourth Amendment]." Hoover v.
Ronwin, 467 U. S. - - , - - (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted). In fact, the lower courts have permitted such suits to be
brought for some time now, seen. 17, supra, without disastrous results.
Moreover, costs can be awarded against the plaintiff when frivolous cases
are brought, see id. at--, n. 27. Even modest assessments against
prisoners' accounts could provide an effective weapon for deterring truly
groundless litigation.
28
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than chattels, a view I thought society had outgrown long
ago.
III
By adopting its "bright line" rule, the Court takes the
"hands off" approach to prison administration that I thought
it had abandoned forever when it wrote in Wolff v. M cDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), that
"though his rights may be diminished by the needs and
exigencies of the insitutitonal environment, a prisoner is
not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he
is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." Id., at 555-556.
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Today's holding means
that the Fourth Amendment has no application at all to a
prisoner's "papers and effects." This rather astonishing repeal of the Constitution is unprecedented; since Wolff we
have consistently followed its command that "there must be
mutual accomodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." I d., at 556. 29
Today's holding cannot be squared with the text of the
Constitution, nor with common sense. The Fourth Amendment is of "general application," and its text requires that
every search or seizure of "papers and effects" be evaluated
for its reasonableness. The Court's refusal to inquire into
the reasonableness of official conduct whenever a prisoner is
involved-its conclusive presumption that all searches and
seizures of prisoners' property are reasonable-can be
squared neither with the constitutional text, nor with the reality, acknowledged by the Court, that our prison system is
29

See cases cited, nn. 15-16, supra.
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less than ideal; unfortunately abusive conduct sometimes
does occur in our prisons.
More fundamentally, in its eagerness to adopt a rule consistent with what it believes to be wise penal administration,
the Court overlooks the purpose of a written Constitution
and its Bill of Rights. That purpose, of course, is to ensure
that certain principles will not be sacrificed to expediency;
these are enshrined as principles of fundamental law beyond
the reach of governmental officials or legislative majorities. 30
The Fourth Amendment is part of that fundamental law; it
represents a value judgment that unjustified search and seizure so greatly threatens individual liberty that it must be
forever condemned as a matter of constitutional principle. 31
The courts, of course, have a special obligation to protect
these rights. 32 Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society.
80

"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624, 638 (1943).
31
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signficance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions oflife are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
by whatever the means employed, must be deemd a violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 358-361 (1981) (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in judgment); id., at 369 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 423-424 (1980) (BLACKMUN,
J., dissenting).
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Disenfranchised, scorned and feared, often deservedly so,
shut away from public view, prisoners are surely a "discrete
and insular minority." 33 In this case, the destruction of
Palmer's property was a seizure; the Judiciary has a constitutional duty to determine whether it was justified. The
Court's conclusive presumption that all conduct by prison
guards is reasonable is supported by nothing more than its
idiosyncratic view of the imperatives of prison administration-a view not shared by prison administrators themselves.
Such a justification is nothing less than a decision to sacrifice
constitutional principle to the Court's own assessment of administrative expendiency.
More than a decade ago I wrote:
"[T]he view once held that an inmate is a mere slave is
now totally rejected. The restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails do not place the
citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords respect
to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual.
'Liberty' and 'custody' are not mutually exclusive concepts." United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.
2d 701, 712 (CA7 1973) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied,
414 u. s. 1146 (1974).
By telling prisoners that no aspect of their individuality,
from a photo of a child to a letter from a wife, is entitled to
constitutional protection, the Court breaks with the ethical
tradition that I had thought was enshrined forever in our
jurisprudence.
See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U. S. - , - , n. 7 (1984); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 23 (1982) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring); O'Bannon v.
Tov.m Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773, 800, n. 8 (1980) (BLACKMUN,
J., concurring in judgment); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 102 and n. 22 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 365, 372 (1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 295, n. 14 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v.
Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938).
33
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Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment in 82-1630 and from Part II-A of its opinion.
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